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THE CRIMINALSATION OF CARTEL CONDUCT IN SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
I) INTRODUCTION
Cartels cause great harm to economies throughout the world. Particularly in
developing countries where money is scarce, excessive cartel activities can have
severe implications. However in the developed world too, the effects of cartels like
deadweight losses, the redistribution of wealth from customers to cartel operators
and an apathetic approach to innovation can massively damage economies.
Preventing cartels from forming or detecting and punishing existing cartels should
therefore be an important task in every country.
This paper shows how South Africa and the United Kingdom deal with this task by
introducing criminal sanctions into their competition law for individuals engaging in
cartel conduct.
As the criminal law is the ultima ratio of a constitutional state, its introduction into
competition law needs some justification. In the context of competition law, criminal
law is not designed to punish the offender retrospectively but to deter people from
cartel conduct according to the utilitarian approach. Although seemingly high
administrative fines of up to ten per cent of the firm’s annual turnover are available,
the level is too low to effectively deter cartels by only imposing these fines on
companies. An adequate fine level is unenforceable in practice and may have
unwanted effects on the company, on the public and customers. In contrast the
introduction of criminal sanctions for individuals affects mainly the responsible
decision-makers. Because not only their money but also their liberty is at stake, the
threat of imprisonment in particular seems to be an effective deterrent.
South Africa tries to cope with cartels through its existing Competition Act 89 of
19981 (“Competition Act”) which will be amended and also toughened by the
Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 2 (“Amendment Act”) when it comes into
force. The Competition Act prohibits hard core cartels per se in section 4(1)(b). Hard
1 Competition Act No. 89 of 1998. Available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Files/pocket-book-
2005-R.pdf (accessed 7 February2013).











core cartels cause many types of damage and it is argued that hard core cartel
conduct particularly affects the poor in developing countries like South Africa.
The Competition Act provides only for an administrative fine for firms in section 59
(2) Competition Act in order to act against cartels, but the Amendment Act
introduces a criminal offence with section 73A. The offence is committed if a
director or person with management authority within the firm causes the firm to
engage in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b) Competition Act or
knowingly acquiesces in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice in terms of
section 4(1)(b) Competition Act. The legal consequences reach from a fine of up to
R500 000 to up to ten years imprisonment or both. These criminal sanctions go far
beyond the previous civil administrative penalty.
However the Amendment Act raises several concerns regarding efficient
enforcement, leniency policy and constitutional issues which will be discussed.
Section 73A Competition Act involves the National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”)
in the enforcement but its resources and expertise might not be sufficient and no
framework is provided for coordination with the Competition Commission.
Further on it is argued that the introduction of criminal sanctions might facilitate the
efficiency of corporate leniency policy in general. Problematic here is that after
section 73A (4) Competition Act, the ultimate decision to prosecute is taken by the
NPA, even if the Competition Commission finds that the offender is deserving of
leniency. This creates uncertainties which might be detrimental for the South African
corporate leniency policy.
Finally several constitutional issues regarding the fair trial rights of the cartel
offender are briefly addressed. It is argued that it seems likely that the utilization of
evidence by the NPA, provided by the leniency applicant to the Competition
Commission, is possible without violating section 35(3)(j) South African
Constitution of 1996 (“Constitution”)3. Further on section 73A (5) Competition Act
seems to infringe the right to be presumed innocent and the right to remain silent of
an accused in terms of section 73A Competition Act. Also section 73A (6)(b)
Competition Act seems not to infringe the right to choose a legal practitioner.











However the construction of the section is unclear and an infringement cannot be
entirely excluded. Nevertheless it seems likely that the constitutional issues might be
subject to future litigation.
The UK had already, in 2003, introduced criminal sanctions for individuals engaging
in cartel conduct in section 188 (1), the so-called cartel offence, with its Enterprise
Act 20024. The rationale behind this step was that criminal sanctions for individuals
ought to have a greater deterrence effect on companies participating in cartels than
the existent administrative fines. According to Section 188 (1) an individual is guilty
of an offence if he dishonestly agrees with one or more other persons to make or
implement or to cause to be made or implemented a specific set of arrangements
relating at least two undertakings like price-fixing, limitation of supply, market
sharing or bid-rigging.
A key element of the cartel offence is the requirement that the offender has to
dishonestly agree with one or more others to engage dishonestly in cartel conduct.
The dishonesty element has drawn much criticism for reducing the deterrence effect
of the cartel offence and not being able to pursue the aims for which it was initially
implemented. It is proposed to remove the dishonesty element and define the cartel
offence in a way which excludes agreements made openly. The proposed new cartel
offence is supposed to increase the threat of effective prosecution, thus ultimately
facilitating effective deterrence. However in the absence of another strong mental
element to substitute the requirement of dishonest activity, the proposed cartel
offence might erode the distinction between criminal and non-criminal conduct.
Individuals committing the cartel offence are liable up to five years’ imprisonment
and to an unlimited fine or both. In addition the Enterprise Act 2002 introduces the
possibility of disqualifying directors. Director disqualifications appear to be a strong
deterrent but are not an effective alternative to imprisonment and not necessarily
superior to individual fines. However director disqualifications are a useful
complement to the existing mix of penalties by adding additional deterrence value
while simultaneously achieving it at a lower social cost.












In the UK much attention has also been paid to prosecution authorities and their
investigation power as well as to leniency policy to establish effective prosecution.
The way of proceeding of the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) and the Serious Fraud
Office (“SFO”) is well co-ordinated and both are equipped with broadly the same
strong investigative powers.
Unlike the NPA the SFO has sufficient resources and expertise. Moreover the OFT is
also allowed to bring a criminal case to court. Finally the arranged coordination and
their case management optimally utilize the existent resources.
The leniency policy for individuals for engaging in cartel conduct is well integrated
in the corporate leniency policy with the possibility of blanket criminal immunity or
the issuing of no action letters through the OFT for individual immunity. Also full
civil immunity for companies participating in cartels is possible. Furthermore a
marker system encourages early applications for leniency by lowering the
evidentiary threshold. The possibility of asking the OFT for confidential guidance
makes the outcome of the application process predictable. Finally the regular and
extensive immunity granted by the OFT to applicants means that they do not hesitate
to share their information.
II) HORIZANTAL COLLUSION
1) What is a Cartel?
A cartel refers to an association of competing firms which have agreements on a
horizontal level to engage in certain conduct like price fixing, division or allocation
of markets and collusive tendering.5
A horizontal agreement is an agreement between two or more firms operating at the
same level of the market.6 Often firms decide to cooperate with one another, while
the degree of cooperation might vary in different industries.7 These agreements
might be advantageous for the consumers as well as the competitive structure of the
5 S L Monnye & S L Afrika ‘Prison Beckons directors involved in cartels’ (2008) 16 Juta Business
Law 13 at 14.












market: e.g. if the costs and risks to launch a new innovative product can be shared
between the parties or if savings can be passed on to the customers.8
Nevertheless, such a horizontal cooperation might have the converse effect. The
purpose of the cooperation might be purely to maximise the profit of the participants
at the expense of the customers.9 An association of manufacturers or suppliers might
aim to maintain their actual position in the market and achieve price stability on a
high level or an increase in prices and restrict competition.10
Such horizontal collusion is considered harmful to the economy as well as to
consumers and is generally known in competition law as a cartel.11 The most
threatening anticompetitive practices like price fixing, market sharing and collusive
tendering are often referred to as “hard core” restrictions of competition.12 If cartel
conduct in this form exists, one speaks of a “hard core” cartel, which is defined by
the OECD as an “anticompetitive agreement, anticompetitive concerted practice, or
anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids
(collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets
by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce”.13
2) Damage caused by hard core cartels
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) assesses
that “hard core cartels are the most egregious violation of competition law.”14 The
conduct “injures consumers in many countries by raising prices and restricting
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Dabbah op cit note 6 at 233; SL Afrika & SD Bachmann ‘Cartel regulation in three emerging
BRICS economies: Cartel and competition policies in South Africa, Brazil, and India - A comparative
overview’ (2011) 45 The International Lawyer 975 at 978.
11 Dabbah op cit note 6 at 233.
12 Kelly op cit note 12 at 322.
13 OECD ‘Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels’
(1998) at 3. Available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartelsandanti-
competitiveagreements/2350130.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013).











supply, thus making goods and services completely unavailable to some purchasers
and unnecessarily expensive for others.”15
A cartel is a form of monopoly, which is formed with the goal of limiting
competition to increase profits.16 A monopoly, meaning the domination of a market
by a single entity, is free to price at a profit maximizing point17 and through (secret)
collusion cartels try to achieve the same level of market power.18
The adverse economic effects cartels cause are similar to the harm monopolies cause:
they create deadweight losses, redistribute wealth from the customers to the cartel
operators and reduce innovation.19 In a competitive market rivals are not free to set
the prices as they wish because of the interplay of supply and demand.20 In a
distorted market dominated by a cartel the price is set by its members.21 Consumers
in such a market are left as price-takers while the ruling cartel is a price maker.22 The
reducing of output and/ or the raising of the price has two effects: consumers pay
more for the quantity they purchase and consumption is lost by buyers who were
forced out of the market because of the high price of the cartelised product.23
For the former effect, also called overcharge,24 one can argue if this is a negative
effect. On the one hand the distributional effect, meaning shifting money from
consumer to the cartel operators, is considered to be neutral because the wealth
remains within the economy.25 On the other hand it is pointed out that the rating of
15 OECD (1998) op cit note 13 at 3; Afrika & Bachmann op cit note 10 at 978.
16 J M Connor, A A Foer & S Udwin ‘Criminalizing cartels: an American perspective’ (2010) 1 New
Journal of European Criminal Law 199 at 201.
17 Kelly op cit note 12 at 322; Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 201-202.
18 Kelly op cit note 12 at 322.
19 Kelly op cit note 12 at 322; Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 201.
20 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 201.
21 Ibid.
22 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 201; Kelly op cit note 12 at 322.
23 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 201; OECD ’Report on the nature and impact of hard core
cartels and sanctions against cartels under national competition laws’ (2002) at 6. Available at
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartelsandanti-competitiveagreements/2081831.pdf (accessed 7
February 2013).
24 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 202.
25 J Clarke ‘The increasing criminalization of economic law – a competition law perspective’ (2012)











the redistributive effect as good or bad depends on the assumptions and welfare
criteria that are used to determine them.26 The preferable view seems to be that a
consumer in a free market has the right to the consumer surplus.27 Therefore the
market distortion a cartel causes which leads to consumers unwittingly paying a
much higher price compared to the competitive price is considered to be an unfair
taking of the consumer.28 In the context of the international consensus that one
purpose of competition law is also to protect customers, this shifting of money to the
cartel operators is considered to be cartel harm.29
The latter effect, the deadweight loss, is the output that buyers would have been
willing to purchase at a competitively established price that they can no longer afford
to buy, or money they spend on inferior substitutes.30 That causes a loss for society
as a whole.  One reason for that loss is that if society’s available resources were to be
utilized more efficiently, more products could be produced.31 In omitting doing that
the society loses the benefit of additional production like the demand for labour.32
In addition to the mentioned effects, cartels are detrimental to innovation like new
products or the adoption of cost- reducing technologies.33 Cartels shelter their
members from the competition of the free market and consumers cannot exert
downward pressure on prices. 34 Therefore a cartel member does not need to be as
cost-efficient or innovative as it otherwise would be if it was not a member, and still
stay in business.35
The consequences of cartel conduct are particularly fatal for the poorest in the world.
In developing countries, for instance South Africa, cartel conduct like price fixing on
consumer goods and food staples affects a great number of people, especially the
26 R H Lande ’ Wealth transfers as the original and primary concern of antitrust: the
efficiency interpretation challenged’(1982) 34 Hastings Law Journal 65 at 76.
27 Lande op cit note 26 at 76; Clarke op cit note 25 at 78.
28Clarke op cit note 25 at 78.
29 OECD (2002) op cit note 23 at 6.
30 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 202.
31 Ibid.
32 Kelly op cit note 12 at 322; Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 202.
33 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 202.
34 Kelly op cit note 12 at 322; OECD (2002) op cit note 23 at 6.











impoverished at the lower end of society, because they have to spend a higher
proportion of their limited funds for these products. 36 Normally this is not the case in
a free and fair market because this implies usually lower prices than in an unfree
cartel-dominated market. Of course people in affluent societies, for example the UK
or the USA, are also affected by cartel conduct; however the effects are usually not
threatening to their existence.
III) CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN COMPETITION LAW
1) Introduction of criminal sanctions to enforce competition law
As mentioned, cartel conduct causes significant dangers to society because it causes
higher prices, less choice and an apathetic approach to innovation.37 However the
question is if the introduction of a criminal sanction is really necessary, especially
because criminal law is “society’s strongest form of official punishment and
censure”38, or if other measures for instance civil liability might be not sufficient.
a) Justification for criminal sanctions to enforce competition law
Given that the criminal law is the strongest form of official punishment its
introduction into the competition law of a country needs adequate justification.39
aa)  Retributive theory: cartel conduct is morally wrong
According to the retributive theory of criminal law a person “should suffer because
of, and in proportion to, the moral wrongdoing felt by society toward the
behaviour”.40  The theory pinpoints the moral wrong of an offence and justifies
punishment because a person is responsible for his actions and must therefore receive
36 Kelly op cit note 12 at 323; Afrika & Bachmann op cit note 10 at 976; Jordaan & Munyai op cit
note 36 at 197.
37 Kelly op cit note 12 at 322.
38 Clarke op cit note 25 at 83.
39 Ibid.
40 A Gray ‘Criminal sanctions for cartel behaviour’ (2008) 8 Queensland University of Technology











what he or she deserves when the person has made a choice which society considers
as wrong.41
One can argue that cartel conduct is morally reprehensible and that it is a deliberate
activity which causes economic harm to consumers and therefore the criminalisation
of this conduct is appropriate.42As mentioned above, cartels cause significant
economic harm to consumers and a cartel which charges unjust prices or that uses
unjust means to maintain its position is considered to be immoral.43 Especially where
the poverty level is high and for instance price-fixing of stable household products
hits a lot of people particularly hard, the moral necessity to criminalize hard core
cartel conduct is arguably a strong one.44 Therefore the criminalisation of cartel
conduct and punishment might be justified, particularly in the context of poor
developing countries.45
On the other hand one can argue competition law is regulatory by nature and its goal
is to ensure consumer welfare, meaning that society gets the best product possible to
the most appropriate price.46 By regulating the competition through the means of
competition law a state shows its willingness to intervene in economic and social
activities to facilitate the achievement of this goal which is considered to be valuable
to society.47 A violation of such a regulatory law, which protects economic interests,
might not carry as strong a moral condemnation as do more traditional crimes like
murder.48 Even under acknowledgement of the “moral culpability” of cartel conduct,
its criminalisation might not be inevitably supported because of the existing criminal
and civil divide in many jurisdictions where much conduct which most people
41 P Whelan ‘A principled argument for personal criminal sanctions as punishment under EC cartel
law’ (2007) 4 The Competition Law Review 7 at 8; P H Rosochowicz ‘The appropriateness of criminal
sanctions in the enforcement of competition law’ (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 752 at
752.
42 Clarke op cit note 25 at 83.
43 Clarke op cit note 25 at 83; Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 208.
44 Kelly op cit note 12 at 323.
45 Ibid.
46 Rosochowicz op cit note 41at 753; Kelly op cit note 12 at 324.
47 Rosochowicz op cit note 41 at 752; Kelly op cit note 12 at 324.











consider to be immoral is not criminalized (e.g. Prostitution in Germany, Consuming
Cannabis in the Netherlands) and vice versa.49
Moreover criminal law is apparently extended to regulatory law as a convenient
method to control and primarily deter anti-social behaviour.50 Consequently the
retributive theory seems to be inappropriate in the context of regulatory laws like
competition law. 51
bb) Utilitarian theory: deterrence effect
Rooted in the utilitarian theory which points out that suffering is a pain which should
be avoided and that therefore punishment could not be justified unless a specific
social benefit or utility can be derived from its imposition,52 the aspect of deterrence
is the main function in criminalising cartel conduct.53 Basically the deterrence aspect
of the utilitarian approach considers punishment only as justified if it prevents or
reduces future crime, thus the preventive consequence of a sentence is crucial.54
Within the theory it is differentiated between specific and general deterrence. The
former aims to deter, through punishment, the individual himself from re-offending,
while the latter aims to deter the public from committing the offence by showing the
consequence, in other words the legal punishment, of being caught.55
It is argued that if the legislator introduces criminal sanctions instead of mere civil
penalties for cartels, the deterrence of potential offenders from engaging in cartel
conduct will be more effective compared to the deterrence by civil penalties, which
results in a benefit for society as a whole by reducing the rate of the offence.56 Thus
49 Clarke op cit note 25 at 83.
50 Clarke op cit note 25 at 83; Kelly op cit note 12 at 324.
51 Kelly op cit note 12 at 324; Rosochowicz op cit note 41 at 753.
52 Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 10.
53 Kelly op cit note 12 at 324; Rosochowicz op cit note 41 at 753; Clarke op cit note 25 at 85.
54 Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 10-11.
55 Clarke op cit note 25 at 85; Rosochowicz op cit note 41 at 753.











criminalisation is justified.57 Therefore the general deterrence approach prevails and
provides the main justification in the context of cartel criminalization.58
b) Need for criminal sanctions to enforce competition law
Already under many current national laws it is possible to impose very high
administrative penalties on firms who are participants in cartels, like the R250 680
000 settlement reached between Sasol Chemical Industries and the Competition
Commission in South Africa59 because of Sasol’s violations of section 4(1)(b)
Competition Act, or the £121.5 million penalty imposed by the Office of Fair
Trading on British Airways for an infringement of the Chapter I prohibition and
Article 101 TFEU60 which was later reduced £58.5 million61. The question is, in
order to achieve sufficient deterrence, why cartel conduct should be criminalized
particularly by extending beyond fines to the threat of imprisonment for
individuals.62
aa) Fines on the company
According to an economic approach of the deterrence theory, the offenders are
rational economic actors who act to maximize their welfare and therefore act
pursuant to a cost-benefit calculation, which involves the risk of being caught and
punished on the one side and the benefit gained from the violation on the other
side.63 Hence a financial penalty alone which is imposed on the company can only
provide effective deterrence if the penalty in question exceeds the gain from the
penalized conduct.64 It is worth mentioning that in order to deter the company from
57 Clarke op cit note 25 at 85; Rosochowicz op cit note 41 at 753.
58 Clarke op cit note 25 at 85.
59 Competition Commission vs Sasol Chemical Industries Limited. Case No. 31/CR/May05. Consent
Order; Kelly op cit note 12 at 323.
60 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, 09 May 2008, Official Journal of the European
Union, C 115/47. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF (accessed 7
February 2013).
61 OFT press release 33/12 of 19 April 2012.
62 Clarke op cit note 25 at 83.
63 Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 11; Rosochowicz op cit note 41 at 753.











participating in cartel conduct, it makes little difference if the fine imposed on the
company itself is civil or criminal in nature.65 Of course a company cannot be
imprisoned and except from the stronger stigma a criminal conviction may bring
with it and if the purpose is not to close down the company, nothing is gained that
cannot be handled through civil liability as well.66
On one hand experiences from other jurisdictions indicate that if fines are only
imposed on companies, these fines have to be impossibly high in order to effectively
deter cartel conduct.67 There is no mutual consent about an absolute level below
which fines will generally not deter companies from cartel conduct but according to
estimations the fines must be around 150 per cent of the annual turnover to ensure
sufficient deterrence.68
For instance, in South Africa the maximum financial penalty is according to section
59(2) Competition Act ten per cent of the annual turnover and seems to fall rather
short in terms of the estimate above.69 The same applies to the UK where the
maximum financial penalty is ten per of the undertaking’s worldwide turnover in the
business year preceding the decision, see section 36(8) Competition Act 199870.71
Even if these penalty regimes were to be adapted to a higher or the proposed level,
such penalty regimes might be unreasonable.72
Even for bigger firms, such high fines are usually not payable because they lack
sufficient funds and assets.73 In the worst case scenario the company is forced into
bankruptcy with severe consequences for all stakeholders: employees may lose their
65 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 213; H L Packer The limits of the criminal sanction (1969)
361.
66 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 213; Packer op cit note 65 at 361.
67 W P J Wils ‘Is criminalisation of EU competition law the answer?’ in R Zäch, A Heinemann & A
Kellerhals (eds) The development of competition law: global perspectives (2010) 250 at 274; Clarke
op cit note 25 at 86.
68 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 277.
69 Kelly op cit note 12 at 323.
70 Competition Act 1998. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/41/contents
(accessed 7 February 2013).
71 R Whish & D Bailey ’Competition Law’ 7th ed. (2012) 410.
72 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 277; Clarke op cit note 25 at 86.











job, customers suffer because the product may not be otherwise available, creditors
may lose their debt claims, suppliers lose a customer, tax authorities lose tax revenue
and a competitor leaves the market which is harmful to competition, particularly if
the market is already highly concentrated.74 If companies are able to pay, it is likely
that they try to make up for this “loss” by raising prices or reducing labour costs and
as an ultimate consequence the consumer may end up suffering.75
On the other hand it is argued that effective deterrence is achieved because the threat
of the fine and the associated stigma encourages the company to monitor its
employees and make them respect the law.76 The company is closer to its staff and
therefore might have more or stronger influence on the behaviour of its staff than for
instance the authorities.77 However this reasoning collapses in cases in which the
company is not able to impose serious sanctions on their staff, for instance if the
manager who was responsible for the violation has already left the company when
the violation is detected.78
As a result it seems not sufficient to rely exclusively on fines on companies in order
to provide efficient deterrence against cartel conduct. 79
bb) Fines on individuals and imprisonment
One alternative is to inflict punishment also on company executives, mainly because
it is very likely that the decision whether or not to engage in cartel conduct originates
from them.80 According to the economic approach it is individuals who consider the
costs and the be efits of cartelising and decide if it is worth the risk.81
74 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 278; Kelly op cit note 12 at 323; Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16
at 213.
75 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 278-279; Kelly op cit note 12 at 323.
76 K J Cseres, M P Schinkel & F O W Vogelaar ‘Law and economics of criminal antitrust
enforcement: an introduction’ in K J Cseres, M P Schinkel & F O W Vogelaar (eds) Criminalization
of Competition Law Enforcement: Economic And Legal Implications For The EU Member States
(2006) 1 at 8; Wils (2010) note 67 at 279.
77 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 279.
78 Ibid.
79 Clarke op cit note 25 at 86; Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 286.
80 Rosochowicz op cit note 41 at 754.











To impose fines on the responsible decision-makers or actors within the firm may
threaten them and constitute a strong deterrence not to participate in any kind of
cartel conduct because the costs are too high compared to the benefits. 82  However
the individual may be “judgement-proof”, meaning unable to pay the required fine,
which limits its deterrence effect.83 However this could be avoided by imposing
alternative prison sanctions in the case of criminal fines.84
The key problem of fines in this context is that it is very easy for a company to
indemnify directly or indirectly their penalized staff ex post which deprives the fine
of its deterrence effect.85
This issue is recognised by some jurisdictions which try to solve it by adjusting their
relevant law. For instance South Africa is going to try to counteract this problem by
implementing section 73A (6) Competition Act which will not allow a firm to pay
any fine for a convicted person86 or indemnify, reimburse, compensate or otherwise
defray the defence expenses of this person unless the prosecution is abandoned or the
person is acquitted.87 Ratio legis is that the firm should not be able to relieve the
individual from the consequence of his contravention.88  Thus the deterrence effect
would be upheld.89
Nevertheless an ex ante compensation for instance by increasing the wages in
compensation for bearing the risks without recourse seems still possible.90
Admittedly it is hard to make the person carry out the agreement because it is likely
to be unlawful and therefore unenforceable by law, but even these difficulties do not
82 W.P.J. Wils ‘Does the effective enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC require not only fines on
undertakings but also individual penalties, in particular imprisonment?’ (2001) Legal Service of the
European Commission at 23. Available at
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2001/Wils.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013).
83 Clarke op cit note 25 at 86; Wils (2001) op cit note 82 at 23.
84 Clarke op cit note 25 at 86; Wils (2001) op cit note 82 at 23.
85 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 286; Clarke op cit note 25 at 86.
86 Section 73A (6)(a) Amendment Act.
87 Section 73A (6)(b) Amendment Act
88 Kelly op cit note 12 at 332.
89 Ibid.
90 C D Stone ‘The place of enterprise liability in the control of corporate conduct´ (1980) 90 The Yale











show that there is no cost for a determined firm to purchase such unlawful cartel
conduct from its staff.91
The threat of imprisonment can close this gap.92 US experience shows that
imprisonment is a very effective deterrent because the conventional cost-benefit
consideration of a businessman breaks down if the consequence of a contravention is
the loss of his freedom accompanied by the social and professional stigma of a prison
sentence and a usually higher media attention in comparison to imposed pecuniary
fines. 93  It is hard to put a price tag on one’s freedom as well as on one’s social and
professional reputation.94 Also the public punishment of violators carries a strong
moral message to the law-abiding which might reinforce their moral commitment to
the rules.95
For this reasons imprisonment constitutes an effective deterrent to prevent
individuals from engaging in cartel conduct.96 Moreover imprisonment has the
crucial advantages that it is impossible for a company to assume liability ex post and
an ex ante compensation for the risk of a prison term is hard to arrange because
liberty and reputation is at stake.97 Even if the company manages to achieve an
arrangement the expenses will be much higher for the firm.98
Therefore the introduction of criminal sanctions simultaneously with fines for
individuals will force them to take both into account. Besides the peril of losing
money, also their freedom and reputation are at risk. Provided that the regime to
detect cartels and to prosecute the involved individuals is potent enough, there is a
high likelihood that their cost-benefit analysis will tell them not to participate in
cartel conduct.99 In relation to a situation where only a fine on the company is
91 Stone op cit note 90 at 53.
92 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 286.
93 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 282 and 285; Clarke op cit note 25 at 86; Rosochowicz op cit note 41
at 755; Kelly op cit note 12 at 324.
94 Clarke op cit note 25 at 86.
95 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 282 and 284.
96 Ibid at 286.
97 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 286; Stone op cit note 90 at 53.
98 Stone op cit note 90 at 53.











available, introducing criminal sanctions for cartel conduct is likely to raise the cost
factor in the calculation and therefore raise deterrence. 100
Nevertheless there are also some side effects which should be considered. There is a
risk that lawful or economically desirable conduct can be deterred because of the fear
of punishment, but this could be countered by imposing prison sanctions only in
cases of clear-cut violations.101 Furthermore there are administrative costs caused by
detection, prosecution and punishment of violations for the public sector (e.g.
competition authorities and courts) and for the concerned undertakings and
individuals (e.g. lawyer costs, management time).102
IV) SOUTH AFRICA
1) Current situation in South Africa
In South Africa, section 4 of the Competition Act prohibits cartel activities.103 The
Competition Act lacks a clear and abstract definition of the term cartel, instead it
provides examples of corporate activities that could qualify as a cartel activity, see
section 4(1) Competition Act.104
Section 4 Competition Act concerns three types of cooperation between firms:
agreements, concerted pract ces and decisions by associations of firms.105 The
existence of one of these forms of cooperation is a prerequisite that section 4
Competition Act can be applied.106
Section 4 (1)(a) Competition Act prohibits a horizontal relationship that “has the
effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market unless a party
to the agreement... can prove that any technological, efficiency or other
100 Kelly op cit note 12 at 324; Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 205.
101 W P J Wils ‘Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and Practice’ (2007) at 18. Available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=939399 (accessed 7 February 2013); Wils (2010)
op cit note 67 at 285.
102 Wils (2007) op cit note 101 at 18.
103 Afrika & Bachmann op cit note 10 at 978.
104 Ibid.
105 P Sutherland & K Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2011) at 5-9.











procompetitive gain resulting from it outweighs that effect.” Therefore Section 4
(1)(a) Competition Act is only applicable if it is established on the facts of the case
that the relationship in question has a negative influence on competition in the
market, a so-called rule of reason prohibition.107
In contrast section 4 (1)(b) Competition Act establishes a so-called per se
prohibition: the enumerated specific restrictive horizontal practices, namely price
fixing108, market sharing109 and collusive tendering110 are per se prohibited, meaning
if they are present there is no relieving justification that one can raise. 111
These anticompetitive practices described in section 4 (1)(b) Competition Act are
also referred to as “hard core” restrictions of competition.112
In the current situation the only available action against cartel activities in South
Africa is the administrative penalty after section 59(2) of the Competition Act.113
Pursuant to section 59 (1) Competition Act the Competition Tribunal may impose an
administrative penalty, inter alia  for the participation in a cartel, on the firm. Section
59 (2) Competition Act provides that such a penalty may not exceed ten per cent of
the firm’s annual turnover. It is disputable whether or not this administrative penalty
is criminal in nature and therefore a criminal penalty.
In Federal-Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission
of South Africa  it was argued that such an administrative penalty which may be
imposed by the Competition Tribunal according to section 59 Competition already
constitutes a form of criminal punishment, because it inter alia  would be punitive
and deterrent in nature and therefore the nature of the penalty might be a criminal
rather than a civil one. 114
107 Ibid at 5-33.
108 Section 4 (1)(b)(i) Competition Act.
109 Section 4 (1)(b)(ii) Competition Act.
110 Section 4 (1)(b)(iii) Competition Act.
111 P Sutherland & K  Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2011) at 5-33, 34.
112 Kelly op cit note 12 at 322.
113 Afrika & Bachmann op cit note 10 at 990; Kelly op cit note 12 at 322.
114 Federal-Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission of South Africa











In its decision in the matter of Federal-Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd
v Competition Commission of South Africa the Competition Appeal Court deals
among other things with this issue.115 Firstly the Competition Appeal Court stated
that the Competition Act clearly distinguishes between provisions which are
followed by administrative penalties and those by criminal sanctions, for instance
sections 69, 70, 71 and 72 Competition Act.116 Secondly the imposition of an
administrative penalty is in the discretion (“may impose”)117 of the Tribunal and is
not a compelling legal consequence as it would be in a criminal matter.118
Furthermore an alternative sentence of imprisonment for failing to pay, which could
be imposed by the Tribunal, is absent.119 Comparably to civil matters, where the
aforementioned is the case too, the remedy for the Tribunal or the affected party may
be to proceed with an application for civil contempt to court or seek a conviction or
judgment according to sections 73,74 read together with section 75 Competition
Act.120 This procedure is totally different to the one applicable in criminal matters
where the terms of imprisonment come into force in the event that the accused party
fails to pay.121 Before there are no actions according to section 73, 74 read together
with section 75 Competition Act taken, the non-compliant party does not “carry the
keys of their own imprisonment in their own pockets”.122 In addition the Competition
Appeal Court doubts that the Tribunal can ever imprison an individual for whatever
reason because its enabling statute is the Competition Act which does not appear to
grant such powers to the Tribunal which would again indicate the civil nature of the
proceeding.123The Competition Appeal court mentioned besides this that an imposed
administrative penalty in terms of section 59 Competition Act does not form part of
the criminal record of the affected party as a previous conviction, contrary to a fine
115 Ibid at 67-68.
116 Ibid at 67.
117 Section 59 (1) Competition Act.
118 Federal-Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission of South Africa
and Another [2005] 1 CPLR 50 (CAC) at 67.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid at 67-68.
121 Ibid at 67-68.












in a criminal court.124 Finally the Competition Appeal Court takes into consideration
the purpose and context of the section 59 Competition Act proceedings, whose
purpose is not to punish criminals by imprisonment etc. and whose context is
corrective and non-criminal in nature.125
Therefore in light of these arguments the Competition Appeal clearly provides
reasons that the existing administrative penalty is civil rather than criminal in
nature.126
2) Introduction of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 127
The Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 was assented to on 26 August 2009
while the date of entry into force has still not been proclaimed. As mentioned above
the only measure the Competition Tribunal can apply against cartels in terms of the
Competition Act is the imposition of an administrative penalty on the firm.128 This
measure applies exclusively to the firm and not to natural persons linked to firms
such as directors. 129 Legal measures against directors or officers are only provided
for in cases of hindering the administration of the Competition Act or failing to
comply with lawful orders of the authorities responsible for administering and
enforcing the Competition Act.130 Besides, the jurisdiction to impose them lies not on
the Competition Tribunal but on ordinary courts, see section 75 Competition Act.131
The Amendment Act goes a step further and provides in its section 12, which inserts
section 73A into the Competition Act, for the criminal liability of company directors
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Federal-Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission of South Africa
and Another [2005] 1 CPLR 50 (CAC) at 67- 68; P. Sutherland & K. Kemp. Competition Law of
South Africa (2011) at 11.4.6.5; P S Munyai ‘Making administrative penalties work: The need for the
accrual of interest of administrative penalties under the Competition Act 1998’ (2008). 16 Juta
Business Law 23 at 26.
127 Competition Amendment Act, No. 1 of 2009. Government Gazette. No.32533. 28 August 2009.
128 Monnye & Afrika op cit note 5 at 13; Jordaan & Munyai  op cit note 36 at 199.
129 Monnye & Afrika op cit note 5 at 13; Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 199.












or persons engaged by firms in a position having management authority.132  A
consequence will be that individual members of a company can be held liable for
acts being performed by the company.133  The offence is committed if such a natural
person causes134 the firm to become engaged in a prohibited practice in terms of
section 4(1)(b) Competition Act, meaning his conduct must be at least causal in the
sense of condition- sine-qua-non for the firm engaging in the prohibited practise.135
Also the offence is committed if such a natural person knowingly acquiesces136-
which is defined in section 73A (2) Competition Act - in the firm’s engaging in such
a prohibited practice.137 This means it has to be proven that the defendant had
omitted, against his duty to act positively because of his fiduciary duty towards the
shareholders of the firm, to prevent the conduct from happening or continuing once it
came to his knowledge.138
The scope of section 73A Competition Act does not extend beyond hard core cartel
conduct as specified in section 4(1)(b) Competition Act.139 The possible sanctions
will include a fine not exceeding R500 000 or imprisonment not exceeding ten years
or both and are inserted by Section 13 of the Amendment Act which changes section
74 Competition Act by insertion of a link to the (then) new section 73A.140
To open up the possibility of imposing criminal sanctions on individuals might be a
major step forward to effectively deter them from participating in cartel conduct.
Section 73A Competition Act will force decision-makers in South Africa to take the
consequence of paying a pecuniary fine of up to R500 000, the risk of up to 10 years
imprisonment or both into account. In their cost-benefit analysis they have also to
include the fact that due to section 73A (6) Competition Act their company cannot
indemnify them legally ex post. Because not only money but also their liberty and
132 Section 73A Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009; Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 200.
133 Section 73A Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009; Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 200.
134 Section 73A (1)(a) Amendment Act.
135 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 206; Kelly op cit not 12 at 330.
136 Section 73A (1)(b) Amendment Act.
137 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 206; Kelly op cit note 12 at 321; Afrika & Bachmann op cit
note 10 at 991.
138 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 206; Kelly op cit not 12 at 321; Afrika & Bachmann op cit note
10 at 991.
139 Kelly op cit note 12 at 321.











their reputation are at stake, and presupposing that the framework to detect cartels
and prosecute the individuals is sufficiently potent, the result of their analysis is
likely to be not to engage in cartel conduct.141 Compared to a situation in which only
the administrative penalty according to section 59(2) Competition Act is available,
the introduced sanctions for cartel conduct are likely to raise the cost factor in the
calculation and therefore raise deterrence.142
3)  Concerns raised by section 73A Competition Act
The Competition Amendment Act, especially the introduction of section 73A, has
raised several concerns of which some will be addressed here.
a) Effective prosecution
Issues might arise because through section 73A Competition Act a different
authority, namely the National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”) will be involved in
the enforcement of section 73A Competition Act.143
Section 73A (3) Competition Act regulates when a director or person having
management authority may be prosecuted. Accordingly a person in the sense of
section 73A Competition Act may only be prosecuted if either the relevant firm has
acknowledged in a consent order144 that it engaged in a prohibited practice in terms
of section 4(1)(b) Competition Act, or the Competition Tribunal or the Competition
Appeal court has made a finding145 that the relevant firm engaged in a prohibited
practice in terms of section 4(1)(b) Competition Act.146 Thus only after the
Competition Commission has made its own determination that a prohibited practice
has occurred, will the legal authority to prosecute a director or a person having
management authority under section 73A Competition Act exist.147 Therefore, the
Competition Commission’s authority to investigate and prosecute substantive issues
141 Kelly op cit note 12 at 324.
142 Kelly op cit note 12 at 324; Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 205.
143 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 201.
144 Section 73A (3)(a) Competition Act.
145 Section 73A (3)(b) Competition Act.
146 Kelly op cit note 12 at 328.











under competition law stays the same after section 73A Competition Act but the
NPA has been given exclusive jurisdiction to conduct a criminal prosecution under
this section, which is underpinned by sections 179(1) and (2) South African
Constitution of 1996 (“Constitution”) and sections 2 and 20(1) National Prosecuting
Authority Act 32 of 1998.148
This division raises several concerns.
The NPA resources regarding Specialised Commercial Crimes Units which are likely
to be concerned with prosecuting offenders under section 73A Competition Act are
limited.149 Furthermore the range of duties of these units is already quite extensive
and covers a wide area of commercial crimes.150 In addition, there is no framework
provided which helps to coordinate the NPA’s and the Competition Commission’s
work for instance in terms of already uncovered evidence.151 This is why there are
reasonable doubts whether the resources and the expertise in practice are sufficient to
allow an effective prosecution of offences under section 73A Competition Act.152
The situation might be improved by giving the Competition Commission a greater
power to investigate and prosecute offenders but this would, as argued elsewhere,
require an amendment of the relevant provisions in the Constitution, the Competition
Act and the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998.153 Another improving
measure which might also be easier to realise would be to provide a detailed
structure for how to coordinate the work between the NPA and the Competition
Commission.154 Due to the fact that the Competition Commission has already
established several coordination guidelines and memoranda of understanding with
other institutions, it seems likely that such an agreement is achievable.155
148 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 201; Kelly op cit note 12 at 328.
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b) Influence on leniency policy
Another concern is the influence of section 73A Competition Act on corporate
leniency.156
Cartels usually operate under high secrecy and therefore it is quite difficult to detect
and prove cartel activity.157 In order to facilitate the detection of cartels the
Competition Commission issued a Corporate Leniency Policy in February 2004 158
(“CLP”) according to its powers granted in section 79 Competition Act, which was
revised in 2008159.160
The CLP serves as incentive to make companies disclose their involvement in an
uncovered cartel or to leave an already investigated cartel, approach the Competition
Commission, and provide evidence of the cartel activity in return for immunity.161 If
they meet the requirements, especially being the “first through the door” according to
section 5.6 CLP, the Competition Commission may grant immunity from prosecution
and hence a fine.162
In general the introduction of criminal sanctions for cartel behaviour of individuals
can make leniency policy more effective if the leniency policies for companies and
individuals are well integrated.163 The integration should be in such a way that if the
company applies for leniency and hence for immunity, their cooperating staff can
also obtain immunity, but if an individual applied for leniency earlier, immunity is
not available for the company anymore and vice versa (if the individual was not a
part of the application of the company).164 It is important that the individual will
156 Kelly op cit note 12 at 329.
157 K Moodaliyar ‘Are cartels skating on thin ice? An insight into the South African corporate
leniency policy‘ (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 157 at 157; Wils (2007) op cit note 101 at 18.
158 Government Gazette No. 25963 of 6 February 2004.
159 Government Gazette. No. 31064 of 23 May 2008.
160 Moodaliyar op cit note 157 at 158; Kelly op cit note 12 at 329.
161 Moodaliyar op cit note 157 at 158; Kelly op cit note 12 at 329.
162 Kelly op cit note 12  at 329.
163 Wils (2007) op cit note 101 at 37.











receive “full immunity” meaning that the individual is not subject to criminal
penalties.165
In the situation mentioned above, leniency policy will be more efficient because
companies which care about their staff might be more inclined to apply for leniency
due to the fact that there is a higher overall penalty discount available.166 Also
because more parties can apply for leniency, there are not only races to be the first to
cooperate with authorities between companies which are members of cartels, but also
between companies and individual as well as between individuals themselves.167 The
individuals’ fear of fines and imprisonment gives them a strong incentive to apply for
immunity and break faith with the cartel or their firm as a matter of self-
preservation.168 In addition criminal penalties do not only incite an individual to blow
the whistle based on fear but also based on revenge on e.g. the former employee for
being fired.169
In contrast, the introduction of criminal penalties for individuals might decrease the
effectiveness of leniency policy if leniency is not available for individuals.170 If
companies care about their staff they will be reluctant to apply for leniency because
they would expose their staff to punishment. Even if they apply for leniency the
application might be not useful because their staff might refuse to cooperate for fear
of criminal prosecution.171 Therefore it seems essential to provide for leniency for
individuals.172
Section 50(1) Competition Act which will be amended by section 8 Amendment Act
sets down that the Competition Commission may certify that a respondent or a
person contemplated in section 73A is “deserving of leniency”. Concerning leniency
for violators of section 73A competition Act, section 73A (4)(a) Competition Act
prevents the Competition Commission for seeking or requesting the prosecution of
such violators if they deserve leniency in the circumstances. Section 73A (4)(b)
165 Moodaliyar op cit note 157 at 162.
166 Wils (2007) op cit note 101 at 38.
167 Ibid.
168 Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 214.
169 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 281.













states that the Competition Commission may make submission to the NPA in support
of leniency for such violators if they certify that the violator is deserving leniency.
Therefore the Competition Commission makes the substantive decision if the
violator is deserving leniency, but the ultimate authority if there will be a criminal
prosecution or if the leniency recommended by the Competition Commission for
prosecution for the violator is indeed granted is held by the NPA.173
It is argued that section 73A Competition Act makes it clear that it is primarily up to
the Competition Commission if criminal prosecution is suitable and it would be
within the Competition Commission’s discretion if they seek or request prosecution
of the NPA.174 Also it is argued that it would be unlikely that the NPA would act
against a recommendation of leniency in favour of the violator issued by the
Competition Commission.175
Regardless if this is the case or not, the NPA is an “independent body charged with
instituting criminal prosecution on behalf of the State, free of interference and
influence”.176 Although the Competition Commission may submit its
recommendations regarding leniency or may not seek or request criminal
prosecution, the NPA can at least theoretically proceed and prosecute the violator
because the NPA possesses the authority to do that.177 This is problematic because
the foundation of the CLP is its predictability and the trust of the violator that if he
fulfils all the requirements of the CLP he will be granted eventually full immunity.178
Section 73(4) Competition Act adds a variable which undermines this predictability
for the violator because leniency for the violation of section 73A Competition Act is
not guaranteed even if the Competition Commission considers that the violator
deserves it.179 Therefore it is very likely that the violator will hesitate to apply for
leniency and share incriminating information with the Competition Commission if,
although it is determined that he or she deserves leniency, he or she still could face a
173 Kelly op cit note 12 at 330; Jordaan &  Munyai op cit note 36 at 202.
174 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 202.
175 Ibid.
176 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 202; Section 32(1)(b) of the National Prosecuting Authority
Act 32 of 1998.
177 Kelly op cit note 12 at 330.
178 Ibid.











prison term or a high penalty.180 This “leniency-opportunity to avert criminal
prosecution”, as a mere possibility, might diminish the effectiveness of leniency
policy which could otherwise be achieved by introducing criminal sanctions for
cartel conduct.  A remedy might be to issue binding guidelines between the NPA and
the Competition Commission on how to handle this problematic situation.181 These
guidelines might help to create trust on the side of the applicants and hence might
preserve or even improve the effectiveness of the CLP. 182
c) Constitutional Issues
The introduction of section 73A into the Competition Act also raises several
concerns about its compatibility with the South African Constitution of which some
aspects will be briefly addressed.
aa) Self-incrimination of leniency applicants
It is not clear and should be considered briefly how the situation would be, if the
NPA charges a manager or a person having management authority with the section
73A offence notwithstanding that the person had previously incriminated himself by
coming forward and telling the Competition Commission that the firm engaged in a
prohibited practice, or even that he or she caused the firm to engage in unlawful
cartel conduct in order to apply for leniency.183
The question arises if the evidence given to the Competition Commission could be
used in subsequent criminal proceedings.
According section 35(3)(j) Constitution no accused person can be compelled to give
self-incriminating evidence. This is one of the fair trial rights after section 35(3)
Constitution and these rights of arrested, detained and accused persons only exist
from the moment of inception of the criminal process, namely form the moment of
arrest.184 In the moment the person comes forward (voluntarily) to the Competition
180 Kelly op cit note 12 at 330.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 210.
184 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 210 ; M H Cheadle, D M Davis & N R L Haysom South











Commission in order to apply for leniency there is no criminal process and therefore
the person is not eligible for the right against self-incrimination. However there are
examples in the South African Law that incriminating evidence provided by a person
in a proceeding of administrative nature may not be used against him in subsequent
criminal proceedings because that would amount to prejudicing the accused’s right to
a fair trial.185 In Ferreira v. Levin186 the Constitutional Court held that a person
before a liquidation inquiry may be compelled to produce direct self-incriminating
evidence but the evidence may not be used in a subsequent criminal trial.187
Therefore if the interrogation procedure outside of the criminal process compels
persons to appear and to answer incriminating questions, section 35 (3)(j)
Constitution may be applicable.188
To enjoy the protection of section 35 (3)(j) Competition Act the examinee must be
charged in a subsequent criminal proceeding and the prosecution must seek to use the
evidence which was gained in the previous interrogation outside of the criminal
process in the subsequent trial. 189 If the evidence was gained under violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination such evidence may be excluded in terms of
section 35(5) Constitution in the subsequent trial. 190 Accordingly the right to a fair
trial is protected by the use of immunity in respect of evidence arising out of the
previous interrogation which was outside of the criminal process.191
However in the case mentioned above the individual would have to approach the
Competition Commission and provide evidence on his own account in order to
qualify for leniency and ultimate for immunity. It does not seem to be an
interrogation like e.g. a summoning according to section 49A Competition Act.
Section 49A (1) Competition Act, although allowing the Commissioner to summon
185 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 211.
186 Ferreira v Levine and Vryenhoek v Powell [1996] (1) BCLR 1 (CC).
187 C. Theophilopoulos, C. 2005.’ The influence of American and English law on the interpretation of
the South African right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination’ (2005). 19 Temple
International & Comparative Law Journal 387 at 409; Ferreira v Levine and Vryenhoek v Powell
[1996] (1) BCLR 1 (CC) para 196.
188 Cheadle, Davis & Haysom op cit note 184 para 29.5.10.
189 Ibid para 29.5.10.
190 Ibid para 29.5.10.











any person and to be inter alia  interrogated, protects the interrogated person in
sections 49A (2) and (3) Competition Act. He or she is not obliged to give self-
incriminating answers and any self-incriminating answers given are made
inadmissible in criminal proceedings except in the case of perjury or sections 72,
73(2)(d) Competition Act offence if the answer is relevant to prove the offence
charged.192
In contrast, in the application process for leniency the Competition Commission
would not compel him to appear and to answer self-incriminating questions
truthfully. It would be up to the individual to take the chance and try to convince the
Competition Commission that he is deserving of leniency. This might indicate that
the use of evidence in subsequent trials by the NPA is easily conceivable without
violating the fair trial rights of the applicant.193
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss every possible constellation which
might infringe the privilege against self-incrimination according to section 35(3)(j)
Constitution in this context but it is a constitutional issue which could be subject to
future litigation.
As mentioned above, the use of such information in subsequent criminal proceedings
might also discourage individuals from applying for leniency or lead to them to be
extremely guarded towards the Competition Commission which would both be
counterproductive to the sense of a corporate leniency programme.194 Binding
guidelines between the NPA and the Competition Commission, on how and if such
evidence may be used in subsequent criminal trials, could help to allay the concerns.
bb) Section 73A (5) Competition Act
Another concern is if section 73A (5) Competition Act conflicts with the accused
rights to be presumed innocent as guaranteed in section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution .
192 Sections 49A (2) and (3) Competition Act.
193 Kelly op cit note 12 at 329: Suggesting that “evidence could be used later by the National
Prosecuting Authority to prosecute them.”.











This right requires that the state bears the burden of proving the guilt of the accused
person and the proof must be beyond reasonable doubt.195
Section 73A (5) Competition Act creates a presumption in court proceedings against
a person in terms of section 73A Competition Act that a firm engaged in a prohibited
practice infringes section 4 (1)(b) Competition Act, if the Competition Commission
found it so or the firm acknowledged it in a consent order. This might be
unconstitutional if it created a reverse burden of proof for the accused person in a
way that the person had to discharge this assumption to avoid guilt.196
However, this is not the intention of section 73A (5) Competition Act.197 Instead an
evidentiary burden is created which obviates the NPA having to re-establish the fact
that there was an infringement of section 4(1)(b) Competition Act by the firm.198
This assumption is underpinned by the wording of section 73A (5) which speak of
“is prima facie evidence”.199 The effect of the presumption is that the individual
cannot raise the defence that there was no infringement of section 73A Competition
Act by the firm when being charged for an offence in terms of Section 73A (1)
Competition Act by the State. 200However, this presumption does not in itself allow
for the accused to be convicted in the absence of other evidence capable of raising a
reasonable doubt, in other words it does not result in presumption of guilt on the part
of the accused.201 The State has still to prove all the other elements of the section
73A (1) Competition Act offence like causation or knowing acquiescence.202
Also this presumption that there was engagement in a prohibited practice on the side
of the firm does not violate the right of the accused to remain silent under section 35
(3)(h) Constitution.203 As mentioned above all the other elements of the offence still
have to be proven by the State beyond reasonable doubt in order to find the accused
guilty. It is not that the accused needs to come forward and provide evidence in order
195 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 207; State v Zuma 1995 1 SACR 568 (CC).
196 Kelly op cit note 12 at 331.
197 Kelly op cit note 12 at 331; Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 209.
198 Kelly op cit note 12 at 331.
199 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 207.
200 Kelly op cit note 12 at 331.
201 Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 207-210.
202 Kelly op cit note 12 at 331; Jordaan & Munyai op cit note 36 at 209.











to prove his innocence.204 If the state fails to establish the necessary evidence there is
no risk of the accused being found guilty if he or she chooses to remain silent.205
Therefore section 73A (5) Competition Act seems not to infringe the constitution.206
cc) Section 73A (6) (b) Competition Act
As mentioned above, the purpose of section 73A (6) Competition Act is to prevent
the company from shielding the director or the person having management authority
from the consequences of the violation of section 73A(1) Competition Act, in order
to maintain the deterrence effect of the threat of the penalty. Although this objective
is thoroughly reasonable the implementation through section 73A (6)(b) Competition
Act raises the question if this is consistent with the fair trial rights of the accused.207
After section 35 (3)(f) Constitution the accused has the right to choose and be
represented by a legal practitioner. In a case where a company is the only source of
revenue e.g. if the company is privately held and the owner of the company is the
accused director as well as the sole shareholder, the accused director would not be
allowed to take money from the company to fund his own defence meaning inter alia
choosing a particular lawyer.208 However the Constitutional Court held in Fraser v
Absa Bank Ltd  that section 35 (3)(f) Constitution does not mean that the accused is
entitled to the legal service of any counsel he or she chooses, regardless of the
financial situation of the accused and that financial considerations necessarily play a
role. 209 He is entitled to a legal practitioner assigned at the State’s expense in terms
of section 35(3)(g) where substantial injustice would otherwise result.210 Therefore if
the accused is not able to choose the particular lawyer he wants because he cannot
afford it, it seems not to necessarily violate his right to a fair trial.
Moreover the section is unclear and several interpretations are possible.211 It might
be possible to construe the second half sentence of section 73A (6)(b) “unless the
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Kelly op cit note 12 at 331.
207 Ibid at 333.
208 Kelly op cit note 12 at 333.
209 Fraser v Absa Bank [2007] (3) BCLR 219 (CC) para 68.
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prosecution is abandoned or the person is acquitted” in a way that the accused may
first obtain funds to meet his legal costs and has to pay them back if he or she is
sentenced, or in a way that the accused has to meet his or her own legal costs but can
be compensated by the firm if he or she is acquitted. 212 Nevertheless the latter
construction seems to be more reasonable concerning the ratio of this section and
concerning its enforceability.213
The question whether section 73A(6)(b) Competition Act is in any case consistent
with the South African Constitution goes beyond the scope of this paper and  it is
likely that its constitutionality might be questioned in future litigation.214
V) UNITED KINGDOM
1) Introduction of the cartel offence
Prior to 1998, engaging in cartel conduct was not in itself a crime in the United
Kingdom.215 First the Competition Act 1998216 introduced in its section 2, the so-
called Chapter I prohibition217, a wide prohibition on anti-competitive
arrangements.218 According to section 36 Competition Act 1998 a penalty may be
imposed if there is an agreement which infringes the Chapter I prohibition. However,
those provisions apply only to undertakings, see section 36 (1) Competition Act
1998.219
The possible fines are imposed through an administrative process and are therefore
civil in nature.220 If the infringement of the Chapter I prohibition ended after 1 May




215 A Nikpay & D Rawlings ‘Cartel conduct under UK law’ (2012).  8 Competition Law International
75 at 75.
216 Competition Act 1998. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/41/contents
(accessed 7 February 2013).
217 Section 2(8) Competition Act 1998.













ten per cent of the worldwide turnover in its last business year preceding the OFT’s
decision.221
Although the Competition Act 1998 allowed for the imposition of high fines on the
undertakings, about five years later on 20 June 2003 the Enterprise Act 2002222 (“EA
2002”) came into force which goes even one step further than the Competition Act
1998.223 The EA 2002 establishes the so-called cartel offence in its part 6 which
provides criminal sanctions for individuals who participate in hard core cartel
conduct. 224
The rationale for the introduction of the cartel offence was approached in a White
Paper225 on this topic. In it the UK Government focused on deterrence as being the
main reason for the introduction of criminal sanctions agai st individuals for
participating in cartels.226  Indeed it expressed the view that fines on companies
might effectively deter companies from participating in cartel conduct.227 However it
was suggested that the level of fines at that time was too low to achieve the desired
deterrence effect and that the fines would have to be six to ten times the maximum
fine existing at that time to deter efficiently against cartel conduct.228 Such high fines
were considered to be disproportionate because it is very likely that most companies
could not pay those fines and would be forced into bankruptcy which might cause the
221 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 410; Section 36(8) Competition Act 1998 read in conjunction
with section 38 Competition Act 1998 and OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty
(September 2012) OFT 423 para 2.21.
222 Enterprise Act 2002. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents (accessed
7 February 2013).
223 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 76.
224 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 76; Kelly op cit note 12 at 324.
225 United Kingdom White Paper: Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition Regime
(Cm 5233 of July 2001). Available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics2/pdf2/compwp.pdf
(accessed 7 February 2013).
226 A MacCulloch ‘The cartel offence and the criminalisation of United Kingdom competition law’
(2003) 5 Journal of Business Law 616 at 616.
227 United Kingdom White Paper op cit note 225 para 7.13.











previously mentioned ramifications for employees, shareholders, creditors,
customers and markets.229
An introduction of a criminal fine against individuals alone was assessed as being
unlikely to provide adequate protection against cartel conduct because in practice it
would be easy for a company to compensate or indemnify their staff ex ante or ex
post.230 As mentioned above, this would deprive the fine of its deterrence effect.231
Finally criminal sanctions against individuals directly involved in cartels were
recommended.232 As mentioned before it makes sense to take actions against those
individuals, for instance executives, because the decision whether or not an
undertaking will engage in cartel conduct originates mainly from them.233 The
executives or decision-makers would have to balance in their personal cost-benefit
calculation the threat of a criminal conviction and the loss of their freedom due to
imprisonment against the benefits of cartelising.234 Normally a conventional cost-
benefit calculation breaks down because the worth of one’s freedom and reputation is
hard to determine.235 Consequently individuals would think much more carefully
beforehand and be more reluctant to participate in any kind of cartel conduct or
would be more willing to inform the authorities if they are directed to engage in
cartel conduct by their manager.236  Also this would make sure that the right people
are punished namely the usually small number of employees who founded the cartel
and operate it outside the institutional framework of the firm.237 Thus the UK
Government was of the opinion that criminal sanctions beyond fines against
individuals directly involved in cartels would be a more appropriate solution to
achieve effective deterrence.238
229 United Kingdom White Paper op cit note 225 para 7.14; see Chapter III 1) b) aa).
230 United Kingdom White Paper op cit note 225 para 7.17.
231 See Chapter III 1) b) bb).
232United Kingdom White Paper op cit note 225 para 7.16.
233 See Chapter III 1) b) bb).
234 United Kingdom White Paper op cit note 225 para 7.16; see Chapter III 1) b) bb).
235 See Chapter III 1) b) bb).
236 United Kingdom White Paper op cit note 225 para 7.16.
237 United Kingdom White Paper op cit note 225 para 7.27; A  Stephan ‘How dishonesty killed the
cartel offence’ (2011) 6 Criminal Law Review 446 at 447.











2) Main elements of the cartel offence
The cartel offence is established in section 188 EA 2002.239 According to section 188
(1) EA 2002, which contains the main elements of the cartel offence, “an individual
is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly agrees with one or more other persons to
make or implement, or to cause to be made or implemented, arrangements … relating
to at least two undertakings (A and B)”.240 It is noteworthy that section 188(1) EA
2002 uses the wording “individual” in lieu of the wording “person”, which is
commonly used in criminal offences.241  This usage is deliberate.242 The reason is
that the term “individual” only includes natural persons whereas the broader term
“person” encompasses both natural persons and corporate bodies.243 Therefore the
legislature wants to make clear that the cartel offence in section 188 EA 2002 is only
applicable to natural persons and that corporate bodies are explicitly excluded from
criminal liability.244
a) Arrangement and Agreement
The arrangements which can lead to an offence being committed must be ones which
operate as the parties to the agreement intend and are enumerated in section 188 (2)
EA 2002, namely direct and indirect price-fixing,245 limitation of supply246 or
239 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 425; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 76.
240 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 426.
241 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 76.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 76; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71at 425; MacCulloch op cit
note 226 at 620.
245 Section 188 (2)(a) Enterprise Act 2002.











production247, market sharing248 and bid-rigging249.250 These stated arrangements
reflect the commonly accepted definition of hard core cartel conduct.251
The cartel offence is only applicable to horizontal agreements between the parties
and does not cover vertical agreements, see sections 188 (4) and 189 EA
2002.252Additionally section 188 (3) EA 2002 specifies that an agreement between
the parties concerning arrangements relating to price fixing and the limitation of
supply or production must be reciprocal.253 This is not explicitly laid down for
market sharing and bid-rigging because these are actions which are by their nature
reciprocal.254
With entry into force section 188 (2) EA 2002 explicitly made price-fixing a criminal
offence. However the House of Lords had in Norris v Government of the United
States of America
255
 (Norris case) to decide if inter alia  price fixing per se could
amount in to a common law conspiracy to defraud.256 In the case the US Government
was seeking the extradition of Mr Norris under the Extradition Act 2003257.258
Amongst other things Mr Norris was accused of having conspired with others to
operate a price-fixing agreement in relation to different carbon products in the US
247 Section 188 (2)(c) Enterprise Act 2002.
248 Section 188 (2)(d) and (e) Enterprise Act 2002.
249 Section 188 (2)(f) Enterprise Act 2002; Bid- rigging is further defined in section 188 (5) Enterprise
Act 2002.
250 Kelly op cit note 12 at 324; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 426.
251 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 76; MacCulloch  op cit note 226 at 619; OECD (1998) op cit
note 13 at 3.
252 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 427; Kelly op cit note 12 at 324; MacCulloch op cit note 226 at
619.
253 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 426.
254 Ibid.
255 Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 16.
256 P Whelan ‘Resisting the long arm of criminal antitrust laws: Norris v The United States’ (2009) 72
The Modern Law Review 272 at 272.
257 Extradition Act 2003. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/41/contents
(accessed 7 February 2013).











and other countries which was contrary to section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890259 and
happened prior to the EA 2002 came into force.260 To achieve an extradition the US
Government had to demonstrate “double criminality”.261 This means they had to
show that the alleged price-fixing was illegal under US law and also that if the price
fixing would have occurred in the UK it would be criminal under the UK’s domestic
law and would there be punishable with imprisonment or another form of detention
for a term of at least 12 months.262
In the precedent decision the Administrative Court held that price fixing per se was
capable of amounting to a conspiracy to defraud.263 According to the Administrative
Court price fixing may well consist of “an agreement between two or more persons
dishonestly to prejudice or to risk prejudicing another's right, knowing that they have
no right to do so.”264.265 On appeal the House of Lords decided that the price fixing
conduct of Mr Norris which happened before the EA 2002 came into force was not a
criminal offence under common law or under statute law and therefore not
punishable under UK law.266 The court stated that the requirement of double
criminality under the Extradition Act 2003 w s not satisfied and Mr Norris could not
be extradited on this ground.267 However the House of Lords held that price-fixing
could be conspiracy to defraud under common law if there “were aggravating
features such as fraud, misrepresentation, violence, intimidation or inducement of a





PyY8et4dJr-h088EhfJA (accessed 7 February 2013).
260 Whelan (2009) op cit note 256 at 273; R. Whish & D. Bailey ’Competition Law’ 7th ed. (2012) at
436.
261 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 436.
262 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 436-437. See section 137 Extradition Act 2003.
263 Whelan (2009) op cit note 256 at 273; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 437.
264 Norris v Government of the United States of America [2007] EWHC 71 (Admin) para 56.
265 Whelan (2009) op cit note 256 at 273.
266 Norris v Government of the United States of America  [2008] UKHL 16 para 6; Whelan (2009) op
cit note 256 at 274; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 437.
267 Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 16 para 6; Whelan (2009) op











breach of contract…”268.269 Therefore price-fixing which happened before the cartel
offence came into force could be prosecuted under UK common law if such
aggravating features were present.270
b) The dishonesty element
The key element of the cartel offence is the requirement of dishonesty which is also a
common element in acquisitive offences in UK criminal law.271 Pursuant to section
188 (1) EA 2002 “the individual is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly agrees with
one or more other persons” to engage in the section 188 (2) EA 2002 stated
arrangements. Dishonesty is a matter of fact, not law, and if dishonesty on the part of
the concerned individual was present has to be determined by a jury in consideration
of the particular circumstances of the case.272 In the absence of a definition by statute
regarding dishonesty, the Court of Appeal established a tw  part-test in R v Ghosh273
in order to help a jury to decide whether the behaviour is dishonest or not.274
Pursuant to the test, first the jury has to decide if, objectively viewed, what was done
by the defendant was dishonest according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and
honest people.275 The second part of the test asks whether the defendant subjectively
would have realised that his action was dishonest by those standards.276 Only if the
jury answers both questions in the affirmative beyond reasonable doubt can the
defendant be found guilty of an infringement of the cartel offence.277
268 Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 16 para 17.
269 Whelan (2009) op cit note 256 at 275; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 437.
270 Whelan (2009) op cit note 256 at 283.
271 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 426; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 77.
272 MacCulloch  op cit note 226 at 621.
273 R v Deb Baran Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689 (CA) at 696.
274 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 426; MacCulloch op cit note 226 at 621; Nikpay & Rawlings op
cit note 215 at 77; A. Stephan ‘The UK cartel offence: lame duck or black mamba?’ (2008) ESRC
Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) Working Paper No. 08-19. Available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1310683 (accessed 7 February 2013).
275R v Deb Baran Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689 (CA) at 696; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 426;
Kelly op cit note 12 at 325.
276 Regina v Deb Baran Ghosh [1982] 2 All ER 689 (CA) at 696; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at
426; Kelly op cit note 12 at 325.











aa) Removing the dishonesty element
In 2011 the UK Government proposed in a consultation document on the competition
regime inter alia  the removal of the dishonesty element from the cartel offence.278
This proposal is based on the grounds that the dishonesty element might put “the UK
at odds with developing international best practice on how to define a hard core
cartel offence”279 and, more significantly, might be reducing the deterrence effect of
the offence. 280 It is argued that the reason for the allegedly decreased deterrence
effect is the low number of prosecuted and completed criminal cases and that more
successful criminal cases would increase the deterrence effect.281 Since the
introduction of the cartel offence only two cases, the Marine Hose282 case and British
Airways
283 case reached the trial stage.284 The latter collapsed a d only the Marine
Hose case resulted in a conviction owing to the support of the United States
Department of Justice.285 It is suggested that the reason for the tenuous number of
cases is that the dishonesty element narrows the scope of the cartel offence and
makes the remaining cases disproportionately difficult to prove and thus reducing its
deterrence effect.286
Initially the inclusion of dishonesty should pursue several aims. Pro-competitive
agreements that have strong offsetting or countervailing benefits which outweigh
their harmful effects should be excluded in contrary to anti-competitive and harmful
278 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 434.
279 United Kingdom. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) ‘A Competition Regime for
Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform’ (March 2011) at 61. Available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31411/11-657-
competition-regime-for-growth-consultation.pdf (accessed 7 February 2013).
280 Ibid para 6.4 -6.6.
281 Ibid para 6.5.
282 R v Whittle, Allison and Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim 2560.
283 R v George, Crawley, Burns and Burnett [2010] EWCA Crim 1148.
284 United Kingdom. BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.5; M O’Kane ‘International cartel
criminalisation and leniency: recent lessons from the UK and global comparisons’ (2012) 8
Competition Law International 55 at 55; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 434.
285 United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.5; O’Kane op cit note 284 at 55; Whish & Bailey
op cit note 71 at 434.











agreements.287  Also, as a common element in UK criminal law, dishonesty should
provide the jury with a familiar element and mark the seriousness of the offence to
facilitate the likelihood of custodial sentences and thus allow for the maximum
deterrence effect of the offence.288 Juries should also be discouraged from having to
consider complex economic analysis about the benefit of collusive behaviour, which
would be the case if one had instead included an alternative element which would
link the offence to an infringement of the Chapter I prohibition.289 As it was believed
that the average jury member would find it difficult to understand and evaluate such
economic evidence, he or she should rather focus on the conduct and intention of the
parties which would at the same time largely exclude most beneficial agreements
from falling under the ambit of the offence.290
Within the consultation it was argued that the dishonesty element is an imperfect
means to achieve these objectives.291 Especially the last point gained greater
significance in the light of the British Airways case.292 The pre-trial ruling in this
case suggests that such economic evidence relating to the effects of a cartel was not
necessarily excluded and even admissible on the issue of dishonesty itself.293 After-
the-event economic analysis might be used to support the credibility of a claim of a
member of an alleged cartel that the cartel had no, or was believed to have no,
detrimental effect on customers.294 Besides, referring to the exclusion of pro-
competitive agreement, though the dishonesty element narrows the scope of the
offence, it does it in a way which creates uncertainty, especially for businesses and
their executives, by leaving them in the dark about the clear limits of the ambit of the
offence.295 In addition, pursuant to a survey that only 63 per cent of the people in
Britain consider price-fixing as dishonest, it seems that the support for a cartel
287 United Kingdom. BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.8; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79.
288 United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.10; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79;
O’Kane op cit note 284 at 64.
289 United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.9; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79;
O’Kane op cit note 284 at 64.
290 United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.9; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79.
291 United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.11-6.17.
292 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79.
293 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79; United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.13.
294 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79; United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.13.











offence defined around dishonesty is only moderate and that juries might be more
reluctant to convict a defendant based on dishonesty than originally assumed.296
Hence the UK Government looked for possible alternatives to this element and
eventually favoured the option to remove dishonesty from the offence and to define it
in a way which excludes agreements made openly.297 The intention behind the
exclusion of such agreements from criminal liability is that it is in the nature of a
cartel that its existence is only known to its members and kept secret from
customers.298  Such a definition around “agreements made openly” would introduce a
factual, objective element which is likely to exclude economic evidence as far as
possible and is therefore easier to apply for a jury than the Gosh test.299 Also
dishonesty in not inevitably necessary to exclude beneficial or benign agreements
from the scope of the offence, because on the one hand there are only a few examples
of agreements that fall under the definition of hard core cartels but are nevertheless
lawful under competition law rules, and on the other hand if such a situation is given
it is not unreasonable to expect disclosure of the potentially offending elements to
those who might be affected by them in order to escape criminal liability.300 In a
response to the consultation paper the UK Government decided to adopt this opinion
which led to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill301 (“Bill”).302
296 Ibid para 6.14.
297 United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 at 61; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79.
298 B McGrath & J Love ‘A further twist in the ‘Dishonesty’ tale: UK Government proposes new
defences to the criminal cartel offence’ (2012) Available at
http://www.edwardswildman.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?news=3234 (accessed 7 February 2013);
Connor, Foer & Udwin op cit note 16 at 203.
299 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79; United Kingdom. Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills (BIS) ‘Growth, competition and the competition regime: Government response to
consultation’ (March 2012) para 7.23. Available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31413/12-512-growth-
and-competition-regime-government-response.pdf  (accessed 7 February 2013).
300 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit 215 at 79; United Kingdom BIS 2012 op cit note 299 para 7.28.
301 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill (Bill 7 2012-13 as introduced). Available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0007/13007.pdf  (accessed 7 February
2013)











bb) The proposed cartel offence and its deterrence effect
At the time of writing the Bill has not completed all its parliamentary stages in both
Houses and has not received Royal Assent. Regarding the cartel offence, the
currently amended version of the Bill303 proposes in its Part 4 Chapter 4 inter alia  to
remove the requirement of dishonesty and to add the new sections 188A, 188B and
190A.304
Section 188A of the Bill is intended to implement the requirement to exclude
agreements which are made openly. Accordingly an offence is not committed if the
relevant information concerning an arrangement at issue: (a) had been notified to the
customer before he or she agreed to buy affected goods; (b) had been notified to a
person before or at the time he or she requests bids or (c) are published beforehand in
a way specified by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.305
Section 188B of the Bill wants to introduce three new defences to the cartel
offence.306 The defences are applicable if the charged individual can show that he or
she did not intend that the nature of the arrangement concerned would be concealed
from customers at all times before entering into the agreement in question or from
the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”)307 at the time of the making of the
agreement.308 Furthermore a defence is applicable if the individual who is charged
with the cartel offence can show before making the agreement that he or she “took
reasonable steps to ensure that the nature of the arrangements would be disclosed to
303 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill as brought from the Commons on 18 October 2012.
304 R Bell & P Henty ‘Amendments to the UK cartel offence are finalised and tabled to the House of
Lords’ (2012) Available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=49c3c3ab-dfde-4420-ac4d-
c276eb3b54d6 (accessed 7 February 2013).
305 Bell & Henty op cit note 304; Proposed section 188A (1)(a)-(c) in section 41(5) Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform Bill as brought from the Commons on 18 October 2012.
306 McGrath & Love A further twist op cit note 298.
307 Body that will be established to replace the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition
Commission, see Part 3 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill as brought from the Commons on 18
October 2012.
308 McGrath & Love A further twist op cit note 298; Proposed section 188B (1) and (2) in section











professional legal advisers for the purposes of obtaining advice” before the making
or the implementation of the arrangements.309
Additionally the Bill introduces in section 190A (1) a statutory requirement for the
CMA to give guidance on the "principles to be applied in determining, in any case,
whether proceedings for an offence … should be instituted".310
The most significant proposed change is the removal of the dishonesty element from
section 188(1) EA 2002.311 As mentioned above, the requirement for the individual
to act dishonestly was seen as weakening the deterrence effect of the cartel offence
and the question is if the elimination of the element can enhance deterrence.
For section 188 EA 2002 to work as an effective deterrent, it is not enough just to
enact legislation which created the criminal offence: in fact the effective operation of
the legislation must be ensured.312 According to the economic approach an individual
will do a cost-benefit calculation in order to determine if the benefits gained through
an infringement is worth the risk, more precisely, the risk of being caught and
punished.313 Therefore the idea of deterrence is to create a credible threat of detection
and punishment which weights sufficiently in the cost-benefit calculation of the
person, here the concerned individual who wants to participate in cartel conduct.314
As the cost of a violation for an offender is an equation of the penalty, the likelihood
of detection and the enforcement costs, effective deterrence can be achieved through
different combinations of the level of penalty and the level of detection and
punishment.315 According to section 190(1)(a) EA 2002, a person guilty of an
309 McGrath & Love A further twist op cit note 298; Proposed section 188B (3) in section 41(6)
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill as brought from the Commons on 18 October 2012.
310 Section 41(7) Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill as brought from the Commons on 18 October
2012; McGrath & Love A further twist op cit note 298.
311 Section 41(1) and (2) Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill as brought from the Commons on 18
October 2012; B McGrath & J Love ‘Bill setting out new competition law regime scrutinised by UK
parliament’ (2012) Available at http://www.edwardswildman.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?news=2939
(accessed 7 February 2013).
312 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 288.
313 Rosochowicz op cit note 41 at 753.
314 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 288; W P J  Wils ‘Optimal antitrust fines: theory and practice’ (2006)
at 12. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=883102 (accessed 7 February
2013).











offence under section 188 EA 2002 is liable up to five years of imprisonment and/or
an unlimited fine.316 Although this threat of imprisonment in combination with a fine
is likely to serve as a strong deterrent for various reason mentioned above, the UK
seems to fall short in pursuing and convicting an adequate number of cartel
offenders, as there have only been two criminal cases brought to prosecution by the
OFT since the introduction of the cartel offence. 317 The reason for this may originate
from difficulties in prosecuting the offence caused by the narrow scope of the
offence and the obstacles to prove the remaining cases, both based on the strict
requirement that the offender has to act dishonestly.318
One could also argue that the small number of convictions might be based on the fact
that the OFT prosecuted only a small number of civil cases and has not sought to
commence prosecution even in plainly warranted cases and is not based on the
dishonesty requirement.319 For instance despite the OFT having found out in its civil
investigations that bid-rigging had taken place on 199 tenders concerning building
projects and that in six cases the successful bidder made compensation payments to
the unsuccessful bidder, no criminal prosecution was initiated. 320
Regardless of the exact reason for the small amount of criminal cases, this
circumstance might give the impression to potential offenders that the risk of being
punished is relatively low which in turn might undermine the credibility of the threat
of being detected and punished and thereby damage the deterrence effect.321
Besides, apart from the reasons for the small amount of cases, one could suggest that
due to the small amount of cases brought to the courts there is actually a lack of
evidence that cases failed because of the dishonesty requirement and that it is
therefore inherently problematic.322
316 Kelly op cit note 12 at 325.
317 O’Kane op cit note 284 at 55.
318 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 78-79; United Kingdom BIS 2011 op cit note 279 para 6.6.
319 O’Kane op cit note 284 at 61.
320 O’Kane op cit note 284 at 61; Bid rigging in the construction industry in England (Case CE/4327-
04) 21September 2009.
321 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 288.
322 O’Kane op cit note 284 at 61; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79; McGrath & Love Bill











However the fundamental issue is that as long as the offence includes dishonesty its
scope will be inevitably narrower than the range of hard core cartel agreements that
damage the economy.323 Through the removal of the dishonesty requirement the
ambit of the offence widens and adjusts the cartel offence to avoid that in practice
only overt dishonest acts are covered which might also be prosecuted as fraud.324
Without the need to prove dishonesty, it is easier to punish individuals participating
in a cartel which increases the threat of effective prosecution and conviction,
therefore will facilitate efficient deterrence.325 It is for this reason that no other
jurisdiction which has criminalised cartel conduct implemented dishonesty as an
element of the offence.326
Nevertheless the removal of dishonesty might have severe impacts. Initially the
implementation of dishonesty was to ensure that only the most serious forms of anti-
competitive conduct were criminalised. As part of the mens rea, it should reflect the
perceived need for a high threshold of individual culpability before a punitive
criminal conviction up to five years and/or an unlimited fine could be imposed.327 At
this stage dishonesty is proposed to be removed without substitution, meaning what
remains is the need to prove the mental elements of intention to enter into an
agreement and intention as to the operation of the arrangements in question.328 As a
consequence of the proposed change of section 188(1) EA 2002, any individual
agreeing for undertakings to engage in arrangements according to section 188(2) EA
2002 is exposed to strict liability, irrespective of if he or she is aware that the
agreement is illegal or of its impact on competition.329 The proposed section 188A
which wants to exclude agreements made openly and the proposed three new
defences of section 188B of the Bill may produce some relief.330 Also the proposed
new duty of the CMA under section 190A of the Bill, whose apparent intention is to
323 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79.
324 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79; O’Kane op cit note 284 at 62; McGrath & Love A
further twist op cit note 298.
325 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 288; Wils (2006) op cit note 314 at 12; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit
note 215 at 79.
326 O’Kane op cit note 284 at 79; McGrath & Love Bill setting out op cit note 311.
327 McGrath & Love A further twist op cit note 298.
328 United Kingdom BIS 2012 op cit note 299 para 7.9; O’Kane op cit note 284 at 62.
329 McGrath & Love A further twist op cit note 298; O’Kane op cit note 284 at 62.











enable the CMA to clarify that legitimate behaviour will not be prosecuted, might
help to clear up uncertainties about the  legality of the agreements in question,
assuming that the CMA will actually deliver such clarification.331
Notwithstanding the basic concern stays, namely that the removal of the dishonesty
element vastly widens the range of conduct that may now be vulnerable to criminal
sanctions and that without its replacement by an appropriate alternative test capable
of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate conduct, the distinction between
criminal and non-criminal conduct might erode.332 On one side comparable criminal
offences like insider dealing and corruption do not require prosecutors to prove that
the offender acted dishonestly.333 Here, too, the harm caused by the offender is rather
harm on the fair operation of markets and the fair conduct of transactions than solely
or even primarily to a particular victim who has suffered loss and they carry a similar
or higher maximum sentence.334 These similar offences may provide a precedent for
a cartel offence without the dishonesty element.335
On the other hand one could substitute dishonesty with an element of knowledge,
suspicion or belief that the agreement entered into is illegal to achieve a clearer
distinction between criminal and non-criminal conduct.336 These elements are
common in various jurisdictions as well as in the UK.337 To take action despite the
knowledge or suspicion, which requires less than absolute certainty, that the conduct
is illegal is an indicator for serious criminality.338 If an individual engages in an
arrangement although he knows or suspects that it is illegal justifies also the
possibility of a five year sentence upon conviction.339 In addition it would provide a
gauge for prosecutors to determine how serious the cartel is and if criminal
prosecution in necessary or civil mechanisms might be sufficient instead.340
331 Ibid.
332 O’Kane op cit note 284 at 62; McGrath & Love A further twist op cit note 298.
333 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79.
334 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79; United Kingdom BIS 2012 op cit note 299 para 7.5.
335 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 79.
336 O’Kane op cit note 284 at 62.
337 O’Kane op cit note 284 at 62; see for instance section 328 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
338 O’Kane op cit note at 62.
339 Ibid at 62-63.











In summary it can be stated that the removal of the dishonesty element from section
188(1) EA 2002 will widen the definition of the cartel offence and therefore widen
its scope. When the element ceases to exist, the offence might then also be easier to
prove. Consequently the prosecution and punishment of offenders might be
facilitated. An increased number of successful prosecutions might create a more
credible threat of punishment and hence promote effective deterrence of potential
offenders from participating in cartel conduct. The downside of removing the
requirement to act dishonestly is that it might be achieved at the cost of a clear
distinction between criminal and non-criminal behaviour which creates uncertainty
on the part of businesses and their executives.341 The proposed sections 188A, 188B
and the prosecution guidance pursuant to the proposed section 190A might help to
create some clarity but there is still the concern that without an adequate replacement
of dishonesty through a strong mens rea element, the boundaries between criminal
and non-criminal behaviour might be too indistinct.
3) Legal consequence of the infringement of UK competition law
As already mentioned above, the maximum penalty for a person guilty of an offence
under section 188 EA 2002 is according to section 190 (1) EA 2002 a term of
imprisonment up to five years and/or an unlimited fine. In addition the Enterprise
Act 2002 introduced under its section 204, which inserted new sections 9A-9E in the
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA 1986)342, the possibility to
impose a Competition Disqualification Order (CDO) to disqualify directors for up to
15 years343 where their companies are guilty of a competition law infringement.344
During the time of disqualification the concerned individual is not allowed to be a
director of a company, to act as a receiver of a company´s property, to promote, form
or manage a company or to act as an insolvency practitioner.345 Also such a CDO
may be placed on a public register maintained by the secretary of State for Business,
341 Ibid at 62.
342 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, Available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/46/contents (accessed 7 February 2013).
343 Section 9A (9) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
344 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at  435; A Stephan ‘Disqualification orders for directors involved in
Cartels’ (2011) at  3 ESRC Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) Working Paper No. 11-8. Available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1879784 (accessed 7 February 2013).











Innovation and Skills346.347A contravention of the CDO is a criminal offence which
can be punished by up to two years of imprisonment and/or a fine. 348 In addition the
offender could be held liable for all the relevant debts of the company349.350
a) Nature of the CDO and its requirements
The disqualification of individuals is possible for any infringement of Article 101
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)351 and for its domestic
equivalent in UK law, the Chapter I prohibition and can also be sought for  abuse of
dominance under Article 102 TFEU or Chapter II prohibition352, see section 9A(4)
CDDA 1986.353 Therefore the disqualification of individuals is not limited to
circumstances in which the cartel offence has been committed.354 Although the
CDOs are essentially a civil penalty, it is for the High Court or, in Scotland, for the
Court of Session to make such an order and not for the competition authority like the
OFT or a specified regulator (or when the proposed abolition of the OFT takes place,
its successor, the CMA355).356 In contrast the competition authority can impose
corporate fines without any independent adjudication before appeals, see section 36
Competition Act 1998.357 In the context of CDOs their power is restricted to: (a)
making an application to the court, which will decide if a CDO should be granted358
346 Section 18 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
347 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 435.
348 Section 13(a) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
349 Section 15(1)(a) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
350 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 435.
351 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, 09 May 2008, Official Journal of the European
Union, C 115/47. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF (accessed 7
February 2013).
352 See section 18(4) Competition Act 1998.
353 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 435; Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 3.
354 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 435.
355 See Part 3 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill as brought from the Commons on 18 October
2012.
356 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 435; Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 3.
357Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 3.











and (b) deciding whether to accept a disqualification undertaking in lieu of a CDO359
which has the same effect as a CDO approved by court, see section 9B CDDA
1986.360
The court must make a CDO against a person if he or she is a director of a company
which commits an infringement of UK and/or EU361 competition law and if the
“court considers that his conduct as a director makes him or her unfit to be concerned
in the management of a company”362.363 In deciding whether or not the conduct of a
director makes him or her unfit the court has to take into account if the conduct
concerned contributed to the infringement of competition law or, where this is not
the case, whether the director had reasonable grounds to suspect that the company’s
conduct constituted a breach and he or she took no steps to prevent it. 364
Alternatively if the director did not know that the conduct constituted a breach, the
court has to take into consideration if he ought to have known it.365According to the
OFT the term “director” also includes a de facto director meaning a person who
assumes to act as a director without having been appointed validly or at all.366
359 Section 9B (2) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
360 See section 9B (3) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986; Stephan Disqualification orders
op cit note 344 at 3.
361 Section 9A (2) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
362 Section 9A (3) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
363 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 435.
364 Section 9A(5)(a) and (6)(a)(b) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986;  Whish & Bailey op
cit note 71 at 435; Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 3.
365Section 9A(5)(a) and (6)(c) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986; Whish & Bailey op cit
note 71at 435; Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 3.
366 Office of Fair Trading ‘Disqualification Orders in Competition Cases: an OFT Guidance

















b) The effectiveness of CDOs compared to imprisonment and fines on the individual
The introduction of the possibility of disbarring a company director from office
through the EA 2002 is like the possibility of imposing a prison sentence and/ or an
unlimited fine on the individual, designed to encourage compliance with competition
law.367 As already mentioned, the reason for the implementation of criminal
sanctions on the individual was governed by the insight that fines on companies
alone, even very substantial ones, may not have a sufficiently deterrent effect,
besides other contingent unwanted ramifications like the allocation of the fine on
customers which might increase prices or force companies into bankruptcy and
thereby lose a competitor in the market.368 By contrast the threat of prison terms in
combination with fines on the individuals from whom the decisio  to engage in cartel
conduct usually emanate, have proved to be an effective measure in deterring
potential competition law offenders.369 Having the possibility to disqualify a director
for an infringement of competition law as well raises the question if the threat or the
infliction of CDOs can efficiently deter directors from engaging in anticompetitive
conduct, and if CDOs even be an equally effective alternative to imprisonment and
fines on the individual?370
aa) Deterrent effect of CDOs
Like a prison term the disqualification of a director is also directed towards a natural
person but as a restriction on his or her career not as punitive or as sobering as a
prison sanction which takes his liberty.371 Nevertheless a CDO may have the
potential to have a strongly dissuasive influence on directors whether to pursue a
collusive arrangement with their competitor for several reasons.372  Similar to
367 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 424.
368 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 424; see Chapter III 1) b) bb).
369 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 282; see Chapter III 1) b) bb).
370 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 286.
371 Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 3; D H Ginsburg & J D Wright ‘Antitrust
Sanctions’ (2010) at 20 George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series No. 10-
60. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705701 (accessed 07. February
2013).











imprisonment a CDO imposes a direct and substantial cost upon the individual.373 It
may damage the reputation and adversely affect career and earning potential of a
director, thus will raise the cost side of his or her personal cost-benefit calculation.374
In addition the cartel offence does not have to be committed to impose a CDO. This
means that there is no need to prove the (still existing) dishonesty element to impose
a CDO.375 Even when it comes to the proposed removal of the dishonesty element
there need not be a criminal trial.376  Therefore the application of CDOs is potentially
very wide which increases the threat for directors involved in anticompetitive
behaviour to be disqualified.377 In combination with survey results indicating that the
threat of disqualification is seen by businesses and lawyers as a serious one378 and
that companies ranked CDOs as the second best factor to motivate directors to
comply with competition law,379 CDOs appear to be a potent deterrent.380
bb) CDOs: an alternative to imprisonment and fines on the individual ?
As mentioned, the criminal law is “society’s strongest form of official punishment
and censure” but its application in the context of competition law can be justified
because, according to the general deterrence approach rooted in utilitarian theory, the
deterrence of potential offenders will be more effective compared to other measures,
for example civil penalties.381 Therefore the question arises if CDOs as an essentially
373 Ginsburg & Wright op cit note 371 at 20.
374 Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 3-4; Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 37.
375 Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 7.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
378 Office of Fair Trading ‘The deterrent effect of competition enforcement by the OFT: a report
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civil penalty382, and for the concerned person less affecting and therefore milder
instrument than criminal sanctions, especially like imprisonment, could be an equally
effective alternative.383
However there are various reasons that this might not be the case. A CDO can only
be imposed on a director, not on the middle management.384 The possible
consequence might be that a vicariously responsible director would be solely targeted
whereas the directly involved middle management members would be spared a CDO
and thus not be threatened.385 Also its deterrence effect depends how close the
director is to retirement.386 If he or she is close to it, a disqualification order might be
an occasion to move into retirement and it might be easy for a company to fully
financially compensate its former director, which is a comparable concern to the
situation where just a fine is imposed on the individual.387 This might especially be a
problem because there is likely to be a time lag between the detection of the cartel
and the imposition of a CDO.388 For example in insolvency cases a CDO pursuant to
section 6 CDDA 1986 is typically made two to seven years after the initial business
failure and so the likelihood might be higher that the director is closer to
retirement.389  Nevertheless if the director is not ready for retirement due to his or her
age or personal life planning, CDOs are preferable to fines because this may hurt the
director in a way which a company cannot fully compensate.390 Additionally,
although CDOs also have a stigmatic effect and send a moral message this effect is
less pronounced compared to imprisonment but more compared to fines.391 Therefore
382 Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 12.
383 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 287.
384 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 287; Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 37; Stephan Disqualification
orders op cit note 344 at 9.
385 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 287; Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 37.
386 Wils (2010) op cit note 67at 287; Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 37; Stephan Disqualification
orders op cit note 344 at 9.
387 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 287; Whelan (2007) op cit note 41at 37; Stephan Disqualification
orders op cit note 344 at 9; see Chapter III 1) b) aa).
388 Stephan Disqualification orders op cit note 344 at 9.
389 Ibid.
390 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 287; Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 37.











CDOs do not seem to be an equivalently effective alternative to imprisonment and
are not necessarily superior to individual fines in every aspect.392
cc) Disqualifying directors: a useful complement
Adding the option of disqualifying a director has the advantage that besides bringing
additional direct costs on the perpetrator which enhances total deterrence, such a
measure might also achieve its deterrence value at a lower social cost.393 It is argued
that it is likely that the stigma and the reputational effect of a prison sentence do not
continue to increase when a certain threshold is met.394 Consequently a director
might be as deterred by a long prison sentence as by a shorter prison sentence
supplemented by a disqualification order which adds some deterrence value.395 As a
shorter prison term entails fewer expenses than a long one and the disqualification of
a director is effectively costless for society the social cost would be less.396
Also the debarment of directors might enhance the likelihood that their reputation
might be damaged as well as the scope of that damage which in total might amount
to heavier sanctions of the job market.397 These indirect consequences would
facilitate deterrence.398Certainly one has to keep in mind that the deterrent effect of
disqualification orders will be heterogeneous across individuals like the deterrence
effect of a prison sentence.399 It would weight more heavily upon individuals who are
more restricted in their job choice, for instance who have skills especially tailored to
managing a publicly traded company.400 But at least in these cases, the additional
reputational effects of debarment might reduce the required level of fines and prison
time to achieve any given level of deterrence and less prison time could reduce social
costs.401 Regarding the level of fines, a high level has the disadvantage that wealth-
392 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 287; Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 37.
393 Ginsburg & Wright op cit note 371 at 20.
394 Ginsburg & Wright op cit note 371 at 37.
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constrained individuals might be unable to pay them which would limit the fines’
deterrence effect from a certain point and hence make them inefficient.402 By
reducing fines to a payable but still fully deterrent level and adding deterrence value
through debarment would increase the total deterrence amount and therefore also
improve efficiency.403
Thus director disqualifications are in general a useful complement to the mix of
potential penalties.404
4) Prosecution and Leniency
To deter potential offenders from participating in cartel conduct one has to establish
a credible threat of being caught and punished. To constitute a credible threat for
them it is crucial that there exists a well resourced body to investigate and prosecute
potential competition law offences.405  It must be equipped with adequate powers of
investigation and supported by tools helping it to detect cartels.406 An especially
effective tool to facilitate detection of secretly operating cartels is a well designed
leniency policy.407 In the context of criminalising cartels in the UK, much attention
has been paid by policymakers regarding these issues.
a) Authorities
In the UK prosecution may be brought to the courts by the OFT or the Serious Fraud
Office (“SFO”).408 The OFT, as the body tasked with the enforcement of competition
402 Ibid.
403 Ibid.
404 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 287; Whelan (2007) op cit note 41 at 37.
405 E J Morgan ‘Criminal cartel sanctions under the UK Enterprise Act: an assessment’ (2010) 17
International Journal of the Economics of Business 67 at 70; Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 289.
406 Morgan op cit note 405 at 70; Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 289.
407 Morgan op cit note 405 at 72; Wils (2007) op cit note 101 at 22.











law in the UK, will exercise its powers under the EA 2002 but works in close co-
operation with the SFO.409
aa) Prosecution authorities and investigation powers
According to section 190(2) EA 2002 the SFO is the actual intended prosecutor for
the cartel offence where serious or complex fraud is involved (except in Scotland
where prosecution falls to the Lord Advocate).410 If this not the case, the OFT can
decide to prosecute a case itself as it did in Marine Hose and British Airways, the
only two criminal cartel cases prosecuted so far.411 In case that it is not clear but
suspected that serious or complex fraud issues are involved the OFT agreed to a
Memorandum of Understanding412 with the SFO which records the basis on which
both bodies will cooperate.413 Principally the initial enquiries in possible cartel
conduct are executed by the OFT but it refers the matter to the SFO if it considers the
case to amount to a serious or complex fraud case.414 However the investigation
powers granted in the EA 2002 are only available to OFT officers but where the SFO
decides to accept a case it may determine to carry out additional enquiries using its
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powers under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987415.416 The powers available
to each agency are broadly the same and authorize them to conduct compulsory
interviews, to require persons under investigation to provide information, to require
such persons to produce documents for the purpose of investigation and to obtain a
warrant under certain circumstances.417 According to section 192 (1) EA 2002 these
OFT’s powers under section 193 and 194 EA 2002 are triggered when there are,
objectively, “reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence under section 188 has
been committed”.418 In addition section 199 EA 2002 grants the OFT the authority to
carry out intrusive surveillance and property interference measures to gain evidence
on individuals suspected of committing cartel offences.419 These powers under
sections 193, 194 and 199 EA 2002 go beyond the investigatory powers allowed in
administrative investigations under Chapter 41 of the UK Competition Act 1998.420
In the cause the SFO accepts a referral the members of the criminal case team will
comprise of staff of the OFT and the SFO under the direction of an SFO case
controller.421 In practice, however, the SFO prioritises serious commercial frauds,
bribery and corruption cases over cartels.422
If it is not immediately clear if the case will lead to criminal prosecution or to a mere
administrative procedure, the OFT will follow the procedures required by the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984423 and its associated Codes of Practice which will
mean inter alia giving the person the standard criminal caution and advising them
that they are free to seek the presence of a legal adviser.424 If a statement in respect
415 Criminal Justice Act 1987. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1987/38/contents
(accessed 7 February 2013).
416 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 430; OFT 515 op cit note 409 para 3.18; OFT 547 op cit note 412
para 4.
417 Section 2 Criminal Justice Act 1987; Sections 193 and 194 Enterprise Act 2002;
Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 430; OFT 515 op cit note 409 para 3.18; Nikpay & Rawlings op cit
note 215 at 78.
418 Kelly op cit note 12 at 326.
419 Kelly op cit note 12 at 327; Morgan op cit note 405 at 72.
420 Kelly op ci note 12 at 327; Morgan op cit note 405 at 72.
421 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 431. OFT 547 op cit note 412 para 6.
422 Nikpay & Rawlings op cit note 215 at 78.
423 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/contents (accessed 7 February 2013).











of administrative proceedings under the compulsory powers of the Competition Act
1998 has been obtained without abiding by criminal law standards, it usually cannot
be used in criminal proceedings.425 The same applies to statements obtained by the
OFT using its compulsory powers of investigation under the EA 2002.426 Such
statements obtained by using theses powers under the Competition Act 1998 and the
EA 2002 are excluded in order to protect individuals against self-incrimination.427
Finally where both proceedings are possible and the SFO conducts the criminal case,
the OFT will consult the SFO before instituting an administrative procedure in order
not to compromise any criminal prosecution.428 Where the OFT conducts both
proceedings it will establish separate case teams for each investigation.429
bb) Effectiveness of this regime
The UK seems to provide a system which ensures effective prosecution. In contrast
to other jurisdictions like South Africa where two bodies, namely the Competition
Commission and the NPA, are also concerned with pursuing anticompetitive and
criminal cartel behaviour, the UK system appears to be more sophisticated and
superior. First the SFO has a well established infrastructure with a substantial
prosecuting team and the necessary support facilities.430 Also the SFO has specialist
skills in prosecuting complex and serious fraud cases which entail that more
425 Section 30A Competition Act 1998. Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 431; Kelly op cit note 12 at
329; OFT 515 op cit note 409 para 4.8.
426 Section 197 Enterprise Act 2002; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at  427; OFT 515 op cit note 409
para 6.3.
427 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 427; OFT 515 op cit note 409 para 6.3 - 6.4.
428 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 431; OFT 515 op cit note 409 para 4.6.
429 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 431.
430 A Hammond  & R Penrose ‘Proposed criminalisation of cartels in the UK’ (2001). Office of Fair

















expertise in the economic crime environment and its prosecution is present compared
to for example the NPA.431
Most importantly the OFT and the SFO have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute
which makes the system very efficient from resource point of view.432 The OFT can
bring a criminal cartel case to court too, if it does not amount to serious or complex
fraud.  As the actual body tasked with the enforcement of competition law the OFT
has extensive expertise and knowledge in handling cases relating to it. Furthermore
the OFT is not restricted like the Competition Commission in South Africa to just
determine if there has been any prohibited conduct. Therefore cases can be brought
directly to court by the OFT without going first to another prosecuting authority
which saves resources regarding competition law enforcement and is therefore more
efficient.433
Moreover in the context of the UK approach it is likely that a criminal investigation
or prosecution precedes an administrative procedur  against the undertaking to avoid
that the latter compromising a potential criminal prosecution.434 As the evidence in
criminal investigations is gained according to strict criminal law standards it can be
used afterward to bolster an administrative case which would not be possible in
reverse.435 Especially if the OFT conducts both the criminal and the administrative
case the resources allocated to the OFT are thus optimally utilised.436 The close
coordination and case management of the OFT and the SFO where the SFO pursues
the criminal investigation in order to not prejudice the criminal case also utilises the
available enforcement resources optimally.437
In addition, in comparison with other jurisdictions like South Africa, the UK grants
similarly strong powers to the competition authority OFT, by the EA 2002, as to the
SFO by section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987.438 In combination with the high
431 Hammond & Penrose op cit note 430 para 3.15; Morgan op cit note 405 at 70.
432 Kelly op cit note 12 at 328.
433 Ibid.
434 Kelly op cit note 12 at 328; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 431.
435 Kelly op cit note 12 at 329.
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expertise in the field of competition law this facilitates effective prosecution and
helps to create a credible threat to deter persons from engaging in cartels.
b) Leniency policy
As cartels usually operate under high secrecy, corporate leniency and whistle
blowing initiatives play a central role in detecting cartels and obtaining evidence
needed to investigate cases successfully.439 Leniency can be defined as the “granting
of immunity from penalties or the reduction of penalties for competition law
violations in exchange for cooperation with the competition law enforcement
authorities”.440
The OFT first introduced its leniency policy in conjunction with the Competition Act
1998 and since then has issued several sets of guidance on them.441 The aim of these
is to promote these policies and make them more transparent to companies or
individuals considering whether to engage in “whistle-blowing” in exchange for
leniency.442
aa) Immunity from prosecution for the individual
In the United Kingdom an individual engaging in cartel conduct can obtain criminal
immunity meaning immunity granted from prosecution for the cartel offence in two
ways, namely through a leniency application by the company where he or she was or
currently is working, or by approaching the OFT directly and providing information
about the cartel.443
If a company applies for leniency four different categories of corporate leniency are
available: Type A immunity, Type B immunity, Type B leniency and Type C
439 Morgan op cit note 405 at 72.
440 Wils (2007) op cit note 101 at 4.
441 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 414; Moodaliyar op cit note 157 at 165.
442 Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 414.
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leniency.444 Which of these different types will be granted to the company depends
on whether the company was the first to apply or not, and whether there was a pre-
existing civil or criminal investigation into such activity.445
Each type brings with it different consequences concerning the reduction of a
potential fine for the applicant company and the granting of criminal immunity for
the company’s current or former employees and directors. 446 In addition the granting
of criminal immunity for the individual also depends on the level of co-operation
between the individual and the OFT.447
Type A immunity has the most considerable effect on companies and individuals.
Full civil immunity, meaning immunity from any financial penalty for infringing the
Chapter I prohibition or Article 101 TFEU, is automatically granted to the company
if it was the first applicant providing the OFT with all its available information
regarding the cartel, and if there was no previous civil or criminal investigation into
such cartel activity.448 Furthermore the company has to maintain continuous and
complete cooperation throughout the OFT’s investigation and end its involvement in
the cartel unless the OFT directs otherwise to get full civil immunity.449 However no
444 Office of Fair Trading ‘Leniency and no-action: OFT’s guidance note on the handling of
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civil immunity is available if the company “coerced” another undertaking to
participate in the cartel.450
Such Type A immunity is also very advantageous for staff members. If the current
and former employees and directors of the company co-operate with the OFT, they
will be automatically granted full criminal immunity for their individual cartel
conduct, so called blanket criminal immunity.451 Blanket criminal immunity for the
individual as well as full civil immunity from the financial penalty is also possible
under the Type B immunity, which is warranted when the company was the first to
apply but there was, for example, a pre-existing investigation.452 However, in the
case of Type B immunity the disadvantage is that the OFT awards civil immunity to
the company or blanket immunity to the individual on a discretionary basis rather
than on an automatic basis.453
If the company only qualifies for Type B or Type C leniency, for example in cases
where there was a pre-existing investigation of the cartel activity, and the OFT has
already good evidence of the allegations or the company was not the first to apply,
blanket criminal immunity to the former or current employees or directors is not
warranted.454
Nevertheless the former or current staff members have still the possibility of
obtaining individual immunity, meaning criminal immunity which is not linked to a
grant of corporate immunity or blanket immunity, under Type A or Type B
immunity.455 Section 190 (4) EA 2002 provides for the issuing of so-called “no
action letters” whereby individuals who supply the OFT with information about the
cartels will be granted immunity from prosecution.456 In these cases where no
automatic or discretionary blanket immunity is available, the OFT will consider on
450 OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 3.15; Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241; Whish &
Bailey op cit note 71 at 416.
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an individual-by-individual basis whether one or more individuals associated with
the corporate Type B or Type C leniency applicant should be granted individual
immunity.457 Its granting depends on an assessment of the overall public interest and
on the overall value added through the Type B or Type C leniency applicant to the
investigation.458
The other option for individuals to obtain criminal immunity is to apply directly to
the OFT for immunity independently of any approach by a company to the OFT.459
Provided he or she subsequently co-operates with the OFT, there is no previous
application of a company or another individual and no criminal or civil investigation
is already pre-existing, immunity will be granted to the individual.460 In other cases
and presupposing the individual is the first to report about the cartel activity to the
OFT, individual immunity may be still be granted by the OFT but on a discretionary
basis.461
bb) Efficiency of the OFT’s leniency policy
In general, besides expertise, adequate investigation powers and resources of the
authorities, leniency policy plays an important role in detecting cartels. However its
efficiency is crucial to achieve the desired effect.
As already mentioned, adding criminal sanctions for individuals participating in
cartels in addition to corporate fines can make leniency policy more effective if the
leniency policies for individuals and companies are well integrated, and full
immunity for the individual concerned is available. 462 Conversely it might decrease
in effectiveness if full immunity is unavailable.463 In addition the leniency policy
457 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 7.20; Whish &
Bailey op cit note 71 at 432.
458 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 7.20.
459Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 242; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 7.23; Whish &
Bailey op cit note 71 at 432.
460 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 242; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 7.24; Whish &
Bailey op cit note 71 at 432.
461 OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 7.25; Whish & Bailey op cit note 71 at 432.
462 See Chapter IV) 3) b).











should be predictable and transparent in order to work well and achieve its purpose
of detecting cartels and obtaining evidence.464
Against this backdrop, the UK leniency policy seems to be well thought through and
effective.
In the UK full immunity from civil proceedings against companies and criminal
prosecution against individuals is potentially available.465 The corporate leniency
policy and the no action policy are designed to work together.466 A company that
obtains Type A or Type B immunity may therefore also, through its application,
cause its employees and directors to obtain blanket immunity if they co-operate fully
with the OFT.467 This penalty discount makes it more attractive to companies to
apply for leniency at least to the extent that the company cares about its staff.468
Secondly, to qualify for full civil immunity or a potential high reduction of a
financial penalty, namely in cases of Type A or B immunity and Type B leniency,
the company must be the first to apply to the OFT. If another company or individual
has already approached the OFT then only Type C leniency and hence a maximum
reduction of the financial penalty up to 50 per cent is granted.469 Also blanket
immunity is not available any more. Likewise the approach of individuals to the OFT
on their own account might not lead to individual immunity if they are not the first.
The potential loss of a possible high fine discount as well as possible loss of
(automatic) blanket immunity or individual immunity asserts pressure on companies
and individuals involved in cartel activity.470 If the company is the first of those
involved to report, then the company itself and its staff will benefit from immunity.
However if it delays an application or refuses to apply for leniency at all, it risks
employees or directors coming forward from fear of losing their chances of being
granted criminal immunity.471 This race for leniency between companies and their
464 Morgan op cit note 405 at 72; Wils (2007) op cit note 101 at 37.
465 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 237.
466 Ibid at 241.
467 Ibid.
468 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 280.
469 OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 1.6; Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241; Whish &
Bailey op cit note 71 at  415.












staff as well as between individuals may generate a higher amount of applications
compared to the situation where no criminal sanctions and immunity therefrom are
offered. 472 This facilitates the discovery of hidden cartels and the obtaining of
evidence needed to prosecute them.473
This effect is supported through a “marker” system whereby a company which does
not have all relevant information about the cartel at the time of its application can put
down a marker, which effectively secures its rank as the first applicant, and provides
sufficient evidence later.474 It requires a relatively low evidentiary threshold which
suffices that the provided information “gives the OFT a sufficient basis for taking
forward a credible investigation”. 475  This gives companies the possibility to apply
very early, thus tightening the pressure on the parties to hurry with an application in
order to be the first.476
In addition, if a company or an individual is uncertain whether to apply for leniency
or not, the company or the individual may approach the OFT for confidential
guidance.477 Such guidance usually takes the form of a hypothetical discussion about
a particular factual scenario on a no-name basis with the purpose of allowing the
applicant to be reasonably sure about his or her respective position under the OFT’s
leniency policy before making an application.478 Given that the OFT will also inform
the enquirer about its views by which it will consider itself bound to what was said in
the confidential guidance discussion, the outcome of a leniency application is highly
predictable and reliable for an applicant.479
Also it is certain for an individual applicant that once a no action letter is granted by
the competition authority OFT and not revoked, for instance due to non co-operation,
the individual will be safe from prosecution regarding the cartel offence.480 In
472 Ibid.
473 Ibid.
474 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 3.11-3.15; Whish
& Bailey op cit note 71 at 416.
475 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 3.14.
476 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241.
477 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 2.1.
478 Holmes, Girardet & Butler op cit note 443 at 241; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 2.1.
479 OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 2.2.











comparison with for example South Africa where the Competition Commission
makes the substantive decision if the violator is deserving leniency but the ultimate
authority if there will be a criminal prosecution or if leniency is indeed granted is
down to the criminal prosecution authority NPA, the OFT’s no action letter decision
is final.481 Even if the cartel activity itself gives rise to criminal liability for another
charge for example under the Fraud Act 2006482, the SFO confirms that it will not
prosecute the applicant.483 However a separate and distinct offence from the cartel
offence like corruption is still indictable.484 Also if a case has been referred to the
SFO before a leniency approach to the OFT, the latter will consult with the SFO if
leniency should be granted, whereas in such cases the granting of immunity is
usually not in the public interest any more.485
Such extensive safety from criminal prosecution is crucial for individual applicants.
Otherwise it is very likely that they might hesitate to come forward on their own
account or refuse to co-operate for instance in a Type B leniency case and not
provide – potential – self-incriminating evidence for fear of criminal prosecution.
Conversely the broad ability to obtain immunity from criminal prosecution builds
trust on the part of the applicants and thus facilitates that they can share their
information without reserve, which in turn helps to uncover cartels and gain evidence
against them.486
Therefore in total the UK leniency policy appears to have become more effective
since the introduction of criminal sanctions for engaging in cartel conduct.487
481 See Chapter IV) 3) a) ; Section 190(4) Enterprise Act 2002; OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 8.54.
482 Fraud Act 2006. United Kingdom. Available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/35/contents (accessed 7 February 2013).
483 OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 8.54.
484 Ibid.
485 OFT 803 op cit note 444 para 8.55-8.56.
486 Kelly op cit at 330.
487 Wils (2010) op cit note 67 at 280; Wils (2007) op cit note 101 at 37-38; M Bloom ‘Despite its great
success, the EC leniency program faces great challenges’ (2006) at 16. Available at
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2006%28pdf%29/200610-COMPed-Bloom.pdf












The harm hard core cartels cause is significant and the poorest in society suffer the
most. The key aspect in this context is deterrence of cartel conduct. To effectively
deter a company from participating in a cartel a fine on a company has to be
unrealistically high. Better alternatives are therefore criminal sanctions on
individuals in order to achieve effective deterrence. The threat of criminal sanctions
for the ones who usually take the decision to participate in a cartel is a much more
effective deterrent than a civil fine on the company. The threat of imprisonment will
force decision-makers to reconsider their cost-benefit analysis and will therefore
likely facilitate effective deterrence.
However in South Africa the Amendment Act raises several concerns. It should be
ensured that the NPA has sufficient resources to ensure an effective prosecution.
Also a framework for the coordination between the Competition Commission and the
NPA should be developed. Furthermore, the current version of section 73A
Competition Act may cause willing persons to hesitate to apply for leniency, and
therefore the generally positive effect of criminal sanctions on leniency policy may
be subverted. Finally it should be ensured that section 73A Competition Act is
absolutely consistent with the Constitution.
If these concerns can be remedied, the introduction of criminal sanctions in the
Competition Act in addition to the administrative penalty will be a step forward
towards a more effective way of fighting cartels in South Africa.
The implementation of criminal sanctions for individuals engaging in cartel conduct
in the UK competition law seems to have turned out well. However it remains to be
seen if the removal of the dishonesty element simplifies the application of the cartel
offence and if it achieves increased deterrence through a higher number of successful
prosecutions. A softening of the boundaries between criminal and non-criminal
conduct seems not to be excluded. Without another strong mental element the
proposed new cartel offence might entail an escalating strict criminal liability for any
individual agreeing to engage in arrangements according to section 188 (2) EA 02,
irrespective of whether he or she knows that the arrangement is illegal or of its











suspicion or belief that the agreement entered into is illegal might ensure a clear
distinction.
The available CDO’s - although a strong deterrent - are not an equally effective
alternative to imprisonment and not necessarily superior to individual fines.
Imposing the CDO depends on the hierarchy position of the manager concerned, and
depending on a director’s life planning it might even not deter him or her at all.
Furthermore its stigmatic effect is not as strong as the stigmatic effect of
imprisonment. However in general, as the possibility of disqualifying a director
might add additional deterrence value while simultaneously reducing social costs, it
is a useful complement to the UK’s mix of available penalties.
The prosecution regime the UK provides ensures effective prosecution. Its
prosecution authorities are both equipped with broadly the same strong investigation
powers. Additionally, the SFO has in contrast to the NPA the necessary resources
and expertise. SFO and OFT have concurrent jurisdictions to prosecute which allows
the OFT to also bring cases to court. This, the close co-ordination of the SFO and the
OFT and the case management make the prosecution very effective.
Finally the UK managed to integrate the leniency policy for individuals participating
in cartels well into their corporate leniency policy. Blanket immunity through a
company leniency application is available. Also the OFT can issue no action letters
to grant individual immunity. The requirement to be the first applicant creates races
for leniency and therefore might generate a higher amount of applications. This race
for leniency is supported through a marker system which encourages early
applications. The possibility of asking for confidential guidance makes the outcome
predictable for an applicant. Eventually a leniency decision of the OFT is final. The
SFO has confirmed that it will not prosecute the applicant as long as the cartel
activity does not give rise to a separate and distinct criminal charge.
The UK’s combination of the criminal cartel offence with a system of administrative
fines and director disqualifications for competition law infringements appears to be
well balanced and efficient. Supported by well-resourced and powerful prosecution
authorities and a well-integrated and sophisticated leniency policy, the UK provides
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